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Damascus Τalks with SDF Chief end Without Breakthrough on Integration

A high-level meeting in the Syrian capital between government officials and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi ended Sunday without an announced breakthrough, underscoring how difficult it remains to translate past understandings into concrete steps on the ground. [eng.pressbee.net], [english.al...rabiya.net]

In a report published late Sunday, Enab Baladi said a government source told Syria’s al-Ikhbariya channel that the talks produced no tangible results that would speed up implementation of the existing agreement, though both sides agreed to continue discussions in future meetings. 

The SDF confirmed the conclusion of the Damascus meeting, saying it brought a delegation from its leadership—accompanied by Abdi—together with Syrian government officials, and that the discussions focused on the military integration process.  The delegation traveling with Abdi included senior SDF figures Sozdar Derik and Sipan Hamo, according to the same account. 

Despite the lack of an immediate outcome, some SDF-aligned voices signaled expectations of movement on the integration file. Abu Omar al-Idlibi, commander of the Northern Democratic Brigade operating under the SDF umbrella, said before the meeting concluded that an agreement would be signed to integrate SDF forces into the Syrian army.  He described a proposed structure involving three divisions and three brigades, including a dedicated brigade for the Women’s Protection Units, alongside separate brigades for border protection and counterterrorism.  Al-Idlibi also said the sides would sign a document related to combating the Islamic State group and suggested the deadline for implementing civil aspects of the agreement would be extended. 

Sunday’s meeting followed a previously postponed visit. On 29 December 2025, the SDF announced it had delayed Abdi’s planned trip to Damascus for “technical reasons,” while stressing that communications and objectives had not changed and that a new date would be set later by mutual agreement. 

The talks are part of a longer negotiation track launched after an agreement signed on 10 March 2025 by Syria’s transitional President Ahmed al‑Sharaa and Abdi, which included the integration of the SDF’s civil and military structures into state institutions and envisaged executive committees to implement the deal by the end of 2025.  However, the deadline expired with key provisions still stalled, as both sides traded accusations of delay and obstruction and no clear steps emerged on handing over state institutions or integrating security forces. 

Disagreements persist over the mechanics of integration. A Syrian information ministry source previously cited in the same reporting said Damascus submitted a proposal allowing for gradual integration that considered SDF organizational particularities and was shared with the American side, while the SDF rejected it and offered an alternative centered on three specialized brigades. 

The stakes are high: the SDF controls large areas of Syria’s north and northeast and—backed by a U.S.-led coalition—played a central role in the territorial defeat of ISIS in 2019, but its future relationship with Damascus remains contested, including Abdi’s renewed calls for decentralization, which Syria’s new authorities have opposed. 

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