Iran’s capital has again become a stage for anger over economic freefall and political stagnation, as protesters and striking shopkeepers push into the streets amid a plunging rial and worsening living conditions. “Indeed, sustained public opposition, protest, and mass demonstrations can lead to fundamental change in the regime, but this requires serious political leadership capable of offering an alternative. This did not happen in past protests, and it doesn't seem we are close to it now either.” The challenge, many Iranians say, is not the absence of grievance—but the absence of a credible, organized path from protest to power.
In an analysis published by Arash Azizi for Israel Hayom, the historian and journalist describes a familiar dual mood: widespread sympathy for demonstrators paired with a weary sense of repetition after earlier uprisings failed to deliver lasting change. Azizi argues that while anger is deep and legitimacy is fraying, mass mobilization alone rarely topples an entrenched system unless it is paired with coherent opposition leadership and a viable political alternative.
That leadership gap is especially acute, the analysis says, because the opposition is both diverse and fractured. Iranian groups in the diaspora remain scattered and often openly hostile toward one another, while effective voices inside the country face heavy repression—many of them imprisoned. Without an organized center of gravity, protests risk becoming cyclical: explosive in the streets, but ultimately containable for a state built to outlast moments of unrest.
The question of “what comes next” fuels the division. Some protesters have invoked the pre-1979 era, noting that while Iran then faced authoritarian rule, many measures of economic stability, foreign relations, and social life were stronger than today. That nostalgia helps explain periodic chants for Reza Pahlavi, son of the deposed Shah, who maintains a committed base of support. Yet Azizi notes that Pahlavi remains polarizing among Iranians, drawing from only one end of the spectrum and failing over years to build durable political organizations capable of coordinating strategy across factions.
External involvement, the analysis warns, can worsen those splits. Azizi criticizes Israel’s perceived support for Pahlavi as an example of foreign backing that may deepen rivalries rather than encourage unity. He also argues that civilian casualties in recent months have further complicated Israel’s image among Iranians, shaping how its messages are received at a moment when protesters are trying to broaden social consensus.
So what would push the system from strain to collapse? Azizi points to a classic inflection point: fractures inside the security forces, including defections and elite splits. But he stresses that such breaks typically occur only when insiders believe there is a credible alternative authority—something protesters have not yet presented. In parallel, he suggests a second possibility: change from within the Islamic Republic, as some leaders might attempt limited systemic reform if unrest persists and survival becomes uncertain.
For now, Tehran’s streets reflect both urgency and uncertainty—anger without a command structure, and courage without a unified political vehicle. As Azizi frames it, the decisive factor may not be whether Iranians can keep protesting, but whether they can translate the energy of mass demonstrations into organized leadership that can negotiate, govern, and hold the state together afterward. “Indeed, sustained public opposition, protest, and mass demonstrations can lead to fundamental change in the regime, but this requires serious political leadership capable of offering an alternative. This did not happen in past protests, and it doesn't seem we are close to it now either.”
Photo: The source