This is On Us: IRGC Intelligence Chief Claims 10 Foreign Spy Agencies Orchestrated Iran's January Unrest
Senior officials within Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have offered their most detailed public account yet of the unrest that swept parts of Iran in January 2026, framing the protests as a failed foreign-engineered coup attempt involving at least ten foreign intelligence services.
The claims appeared in an extended interview published by Javan, a conservative daily with close ties to the IRGC, known for its hardline security and political coverage, with Brigadier General Majid Khademi, head of the IRGC's Intelligence Organization. The interview was framed around Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's characterization of the events as "a coup that failed."
According to Khademi, the plot was set in motion following Israel's defeat in what he described as a 12-day war against Iran, after which adversaries shifted their strategy from direct military confrontation to fomenting domestic instability. "Friendly intelligence services had explicitly told us that the enemy was no longer focused on direct military attack, but on creating internal chaos and destabilizing Iran," he said.
Khademi identified Unit 8200 of Israeli military intelligence as playing a particularly prominent role, deploying what he described as a small number of real users alongside millions of automated bots across social media platforms to manipulate public perception. He claimed that Meta deliberately disabled follower-list visibility for Iranian Instagram accounts to shield the protest network, and that Telegram and X were similarly exploited through mass bot deployment.
The IRGC intelligence chief described the operation as a "cognitive warfare" campaign designed to build a parallel online reality disconnected from conditions on the ground — one intended to recruit young people who, he argued, would not otherwise have taken to the streets had economic grievances not been deliberately inflamed. He drew explicit parallels to ISIS tactics, alleging that some operatives were directed — in some cases using narcotics and psychotropic substances — to commit acts of extreme violence including arson and mutilation, in order to generate fear and provoke a government crackdown that could serve as a pretext for foreign intervention.
Khademi said that in the months before the unrest, IRGC intelligence had summoned over 2,700 individuals connected to hostile networks, counselled some 13,000 "vulnerable elements," and confiscated more than 1,173 unlicensed weapons. He denied that security forces were caught off guard, though he acknowledged that the enemy's decision to deploy "unbridled violence" accelerated the timeline in ways that complicated the response.
The general identified several reasons the operation ultimately failed: a rushed timetable that left parts of the network unprepared, deep public distrust of US and Israeli officials, the absence of a meaningful political split within Iran's government or legislature, and what he called the "historical aversion" of Iranians to foreign interference.
Looking ahead, Khademi warned that adversaries have not abandoned their destabilization agenda, but suggested that Iran's adversaries are themselves constrained by the knowledge that the Islamic Republic responds to existential threats with strikes on existential targets — a deterrent he said has made them cautious about pursuing the most dangerous scenarios.