How the US-Israeli War on Iran Reshapes the Risk Calculus for NATO’s Southeastern Flank
On 28 February 2026, the US-Israeli joint military operation against Iran and Tehran’s retaliatory strikes across the Middle East have instantaneously transformed the security environment for NATO’s southeastern flank. Turkey, Cyprus and Greece — each differently positioned but collectively exposed — face an interlocking set of risks ranging from direct military entanglement and mass displacement to energy shocks and the destabilisation of a fragile regional order they have spent years trying to navigate. This analysis examines the immediate dangers facing each country and assesses the medium-term implications of what has already become the most significant military escalation in the Middle East since the 2003 Iraq War.
1. Turkey: The Most Exposed NATO Flank
Of the three countries under examination, Turkey faces by far the most acute and multidimensional risk profile. It shares a 560-kilometre border with Iran, borders Iraq and Syria, hosts NATO’s southernmost early-warning infrastructure, and already bears the weight of the world’s largest refugee population. The war that erupted on 28 February has activated virtually every Turkish nightmare scenario simultaneously.
1.1 The Migration Tsunami
Turkish authorities have been preparing for this moment since at least September 2025. The Turkish National Intelligence Academy’s post-mortem on the June 2025 Twelve-Day War explicitly warned that a comprehensive security crisis in Iran could trigger a migration wave that, in terms of volume and complexity, would be incomparable to the Syrian crisis. Their analysis identified the prospect of a “double wave”: Iranians fleeing the regime or war, alongside the estimated 4.5 million Afghan refugees living in Iran who would be displaced for a second time.
Turkey already hosts approximately 2.3–3 million Syrian refugees, a legacy that has placed enormous strain on public services and become a lightning rod in domestic politics. Turkish officials estimated that a full-scale war could push up to one million Iranian refugees toward the Turkish border. Ankara has made clear it will not repeat the open-door policy of the Syrian crisis. The defence ministry reported in recent weeks that the 560-kilometre border has been reinforced with 203 electro-optical towers, a 380-kilometre modular concrete wall, and 553 kilometres of defensive ditches. Contingency plans reportedly include establishing refugee camps on the Iranian side of the border and, in an extreme scenario, cross-border military operations to prevent refugees from reaching Turkey — a prospect the presidential office has officially denied but diplomatic sources have not ruled out.
A critical complication is Iran’s large Azerbaijani Turk population, estimated at 12 to 25 million people. If Turkic Iranians were to gather at the border in significant numbers, it could trigger intense domestic pressure to admit them, pitting security imperatives against ethnic solidarity and nationalist sentiment. This variable alone could fracture Ankara’s carefully calibrated containment strategy.
1.2 The Military Exposure
Turkey’s NATO membership creates a second layer of risk. The Kürecık early-warning radar facility in southeastern Turkey is a key component of NATO’s ballistic missile defence architecture and has been monitoring Iranian missile activity. NATO’s E-3A AWACS aircraft, operating from Konya, have in recent weeks redirected their surveillance from Russia toward Iran — a striking reallocation that signals how seriously the Alliance is taking the threat. Turkey’s İncirlik Air Base, while not reported to be directly involved in the current strikes, remains one of the most significant US military installations in the region.
Iran has declared that all US assets in the region are “legitimate targets.” While Iran has historically maintained a pragmatic relationship with Turkey and avoided direct confrontation for three centuries, the current escalation’s unprecedented scope — with Iranian missiles already striking sovereign states across the Gulf — raises the question of whether NATO infrastructure on Turkish soil could be drawn into the targeting calculus. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned in the days before the attack that Israel was “looking for an opportunity to strike Iran,” and President Erdoğan told his Iranian counterpart that Turkey was opposed to any foreign intervention. The fact that Turkey was among the small group of US allies notified in advance of the Israeli attack reflects both its strategic importance and the delicacy of its position.
1.3 The Kurdish Dimension
Ankara’s third major concern is that instability in Iran could empower Kurdish armed groups to exploit the resulting power vacuum, replicating the pattern seen in Iraq after 2003 and Syria after 2011. Turkey initiated negotiations with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in October 2025, partly to prevent the group from being used as a proxy by either Iran or Israel. However, the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), the PKK’s Iranian offshoot, has not yet heeded Öcalan’s February call to disarm. If the Iranian state’s grip weakens in Kurdish-populated western Iran, PJAK could emerge as the latest non-state actor to undermine Turkish security from across a neighbouring state’s territory. The Washington Institute has assessed that this concern, more than any other, drives Ankara’s fundamental opposition to Iranian regime collapse.
1.4 Energy and Economic Shock
Turkey imports a significant portion of its natural gas from Iran. The closure of Iranian, Iraqi, and Gulf airspace, combined with the disruption to shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz, threatens an immediate spike in global energy prices that Turkey’s already inflation-battered economy can ill afford. Turkish Airlines has cancelled flights to more than ten regional destinations. The cumulative effect of energy disruption, trade paralysis with Iran and Iraq, the potential costs of border reinforcement, and the economic burden of any refugee influx could push Turkey’s economy into a genuine crisis at a moment when the government is already managing chronic inflation and sluggish growth.
2. Cyprus: The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier in a Shooting War
Cyprus occupies a uniquely paradoxical position in this crisis: it is not a military actor, yet it hosts one of the most significant military installations in the entire Eastern Mediterranean — the British Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, which sit on sovereign British territory and operate outside the Republic of Cyprus’s jurisdiction. The island’s proximity to the Levant (approximately 200 kilometres from the Syrian and Lebanese coasts) and its role as a logistical hub for Western military operations make it both strategically invaluable and potentially vulnerable.
2.1 The Akrotiri Question
RAF Akrotiri has been described as Britain’s permanent aircraft carrier in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the weeks preceding the 28 February attack, the UK reinforced the base significantly: six F-35B stealth fighters were deployed from RAF Marham on 6 February, joining the approximately 10–14 Typhoon FGR4s already stationed there. Two RAF Voyager tanker aircraft were also repositioned. However, the UK government explicitly denied the US permission to use Akrotiri for offensive operations against Iran, citing concerns about breaching international law. London also blocked the use of bases on Diego Garcia and at Fairford. This marks the third time Britain has refused Washington’s request for base access.
As of Saturday morning, the UK confirmed it was “not involved” in the US-Israeli strikes. However, A400M military transport aircraft were observed flying from Brize Norton toward Cyprus, and the base’s posture is being bolstered. The deployments have been characterised as defensive: protecting the base and the Sovereign Base Areas in the event of regional spillover. Prime Minister Starmer convened a COBRA emergency meeting.
The distinction between offensive and defensive use is critical but fragile. Iran has warned since 2024 that any nation allowing its territory to be used as a staging ground for hostile acts would be held accountable. While the UK’s refusal to authorise offensive operations provides a degree of insulation, the concentration of Western military assets on the island — combined with former Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn’s recent claims that Akrotiri is being used to deliver weaponry to Israel — means that perceptions of the base’s role may matter as much as legal realities. Akrotiri is well within the range of Iran’s Khorramshahr-4 ballistic missiles (2,000–3,000 km range), and military analysts have noted that the base lacks permanent ground-based air defence systems, relying instead on deployed fighter aircraft for protection.
2.2 Civilian Impact and Migration Risk
For the Republic of Cyprus itself, the immediate risks are less direct but nonetheless significant. The island’s tourism-dependent economy is vulnerable to any perception of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The closure of airspace across the region has already disrupted flights, and Aegean Airlines has suspended services. A prolonged conflict could deter tourism throughout the 2026 summer season.
Migration is the medium-term concern. During the Syrian civil war, Cyprus experienced a significant increase in asylum seekers arriving by boat from Lebanon and Syria. A sustained regional war that destabilises Lebanon — where Israel is already intensifying strikes on Hezbollah positions — could reactivate this maritime migration route. Cyprus, as the EU’s easternmost member state, has repeatedly called for greater European solidarity on irregular migration but has limited capacity to manage large inflows independently.
The political dimension adds complexity. The British Sovereign Base Areas sit alongside the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish military presence in the north. Any military incident involving Akrotiri could have cascading political implications for the island’s already delicate balance of power and sovereignty arrangements. Netanyahu’s recent proposal for a regional “hexagon” alliance including Israel, India, Greece and Cyprus further entangles Nicosia in great-power alignments it may prefer to avoid.
3. Greece: Strategic Rear or Frontline Target?
Greece’s exposure to the Iran crisis has escalated dramatically and rapidly. What appeared a week ago to be a manageable role as a logistics hub for US force posturing has, with the eruption of active hostilities, transformed into something altogether more precarious. The concentration of American military assets on Greek soil has turned the question of whether Crete is a strategic rear area or a potential frontline target from an academic exercise into an urgent policy dilemma.
3.1 Souda Bay: From Logistics Hub to High-Value Target
Naval Support Activity Souda Bay on Crete is the centrepiece of Greece’s exposure. The USS Gerald R. Ford, the world’s largest aircraft carrier, arrived at Souda Bay on 23 February for resupply before proceeding to join the USS Abraham Lincoln in Middle Eastern waters. Open-source intelligence tracking in the days before the attack revealed an extraordinary surge of US military assets at the base: approximately a dozen F-22 Raptor stealth fighters transited through the UK en route to the region, while large numbers of F-35s, A-10 ground-attack aircraft, KC-135 aerial refuelling tankers, C-17 transports, and special operations aircraft were all spotted at Souda Bay.
The base’s deep-water port and airfield infrastructure make it the most important US/NATO operational hub in the Eastern Mediterranean. Patriot PAC-3 air defence batteries have been stationed on the island. However, as Greek military analysts and local activists have both noted, the distance from western Iran to Crete is approximately 2,100 kilometres — well within the range of Iran’s Khorramshahr-4 and Sejjil ballistic missiles. Military analysts have warned that a “saturation attack,” with dozens of missiles and drones launched simultaneously, could overwhelm existing defences. The Pan-Cretan Peace Committee organised protests in Chania against the USS Gerald R. Ford’s presence, with demonstrators arguing that by hosting the tools of a potential strike against Tehran, Greece has effectively entered the line of fire.
The question now is no longer theoretical. Iran has already struck US bases in four sovereign states today. Souda Bay represents one of the most significant concentrations of US military power outside the immediate theatre of operations. Whether Iran’s “no red lines” posture extends to NATO territory in Europe is an open question with existential implications.
3.2 The Alexandroupoli Factor
Greece’s strategic exposure extends beyond Crete. The port of Alexandroupoli in northeastern Greece has emerged as an increasingly important US logistics hub, partly as an alternative to Turkish straits for moving military equipment into the Black Sea region and, more recently, into the broader Eastern Mediterranean. The diversification of US basing and logistics across Greek territory deepens Greece’s integration into American power-projection architecture — an asset in peacetime alliance management, but a liability when the US is actively at war in the broader region.
3.3 Migration Cascade
Greece faces migration pressures not directly from Iran but through a cascading chain. If Turkey’s eastern border is overwhelmed or if the war destabilises the broader region, secondary migration flows through Turkey toward the Aegean islands and the Greek-Turkish land border in Evros could intensify. The EU-Turkey migration deal, already fraying, would come under immense pressure if Turkey itself is managing a border crisis and an economic shock simultaneously. Greece’s experience with the 2015–2016 migration crisis — when it bore a disproportionate share of arrivals — makes this a particularly sensitive political and humanitarian vulnerability.
3.4 Energy and Shipping
Greece’s shipping industry, the world’s largest by fleet tonnage, is profoundly exposed to any disruption in the Strait of Hormuz and the broader Gulf shipping lanes. Greek-owned tankers carry a significant proportion of global oil trade. The Houthis’ previous Red Sea campaign already demonstrated the vulnerability of commercial shipping to regional conflict. A sustained US-Iran war, with Iran threatening to target all US assets in the region and with explosions already reported from Dubai to Riyadh, could create insurance, routing, and security costs that ripple directly through the Greek maritime economy. Energy prices, already elevated, will spike further, affecting both the Greek economy and the EU more broadly.
4. The Greek-Turkish Paradox: Shared Vulnerability, Divergent Interests
The US-Iran war creates an unusual dynamic between Athens and Ankara. In one reading, shared vulnerability to the same crisis — migration, energy, military exposure, regional instability — could incentivise cooperation. Greece and Turkey have both served as staging grounds for US force projection. Both face the prospect of refugee flows. Both would suffer from energy price spikes and the disruption of Eastern Mediterranean commerce.
In another reading, however, the crisis could exacerbate existing tensions. Turkey’s role as a border state with Iran, its deeper integration into Middle Eastern power politics, and its more complex relationship with the US create fundamentally different policy imperatives from those of Greece, which is more aligned with the Western alliance’s posture. If Turkey were to exercise its contingency plan for a cross-border buffer zone in Iran, it would further establish Ankara as a unilateral military actor in the region, a prospect that has historically alarmed Athens. Conversely, Greece’s hosting of the USS Gerald R. Ford and its expanding role as a US basing hub may be viewed in Ankara as an attempt to deepen the Athens-Washington axis at Turkey’s expense.
The Cyprus dimension adds a further complication. The British bases on Cyprus — with their reinforced fighter presence — sit in a geopolitical space shaped by both Greek-Cypriot sovereignty concerns and Turkey’s military presence in the north. Any incident involving Akrotiri, or any shift in the bases’ perceived role, could have implications that go well beyond the Iran conflict.
5. Conclusions and Risk Assessment
The events of 28 February 2026 have fundamentally altered the risk landscape for NATO’s southeastern flank. The following assessments can be drawn:
Turkey faces the highest immediate risk. The convergence of migration pressure, military exposure through NATO infrastructure, the Kurdish dimension, and energy dependence creates a multi-vector crisis that could overwhelm Ankara’s considerable but finite capacity to manage simultaneous threats. The Azerbaijani Turk variable introduces an emotional and political wildcard that no contingency plan can fully address. Turkey’s 560-kilometre border with Iran is the most critical fault line outside the immediate theatre of operations.
Cyprus faces significant but indirect danger. The UK’s refusal to authorise offensive operations from Akrotiri provides a degree of protection, but the concentration of Western military assets on the island, combined with its proximity to the Levant and its vulnerability to Iranian long-range missiles, means the risk is real and growing. The political sensitivity of the Sovereign Base Areas adds a layer of complexity that is unique to Cyprus. Tourism disruption and potential maritime migration from a destabilised Lebanon are the most likely civilian impacts.
Greece’s strategic rear may become a frontline. The surge of US military assets at Souda Bay, while a reflection of the deep US-Greek defence partnership, has made Crete a high-value target in a conflict where Iran has demonstrated its willingness to strike beyond its immediate neighbourhood. The shipping industry’s exposure and the cascading migration risk through Turkey compound the direct military dimension. The protests in Chania reflect a legitimate public concern that Greece’s hospitality toward NATO assets could exact a price that Greek citizens did not consent to pay.
All three countries share a common interest in de-escalation but have limited leverage to achieve it. Turkey’s mediation efforts, which were active until the eve of the strikes, have been sidelined by events. Greece and Cyprus, as EU members, can channel their concerns through Brussels, but the EU’s capacity to influence the trajectory of a US-Israeli military operation is minimal. The most consequential decisions will be made in Washington, Tehran and Tel Aviv. For Ankara, Athens, Nicosia and the British military establishment on Cyprus, the coming days will be a test of preparedness, nerve and the resilience of institutions that were designed for a different era of Middle Eastern conflict.
This analysis was prepared on 28 February 2026 based on developing events. Assessments are necessarily provisional and subject to revision as the situation evolves.
Sources: Al Jazeera English; BBC Persian; Cyprus Mail; Greek City Times; GreekReporter; Middle East Eye; The Washington Institute; IranWire; The Aviationist; UK Defence Journal; INSS; Chatham House; Bloomberg; Reuters; AFP; CNN; Times of Israel; official statements from the governments of Turkey, the United Kingdom, Greece and Cyprus.