By Dr. Joseph Dib
The wider the war on Iran becomes, the clearer it appears that the biggest beneficiary is sitting in Moscow, not Tehran, Washington, or Tel Aviv. The issue is measured not by the number of missiles fired or the sheer breadth of the fronts, but by what the war has done to energy markets, Western priorities, and the distribution of military and political pressure between Ukraine and the Middle East. Viewed from that angle, Russian President Vladimir Putin emerges as a bigger winner than the battlefield maps alone would suggest.
The first thing Putin gains from this war is money. Under the pressure of the energy shock, the US administration is no longer acting as though choking off Russian revenues is the absolute priority. In that context, it emerged that the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) had issued two licenses allowing the continued sale of Russian oil cargoes that had already been loaded, reflecting a new reality in which market stability is beginning to rival the logic of punishment. This is not a technical footnote; it is a practical acknowledgment that the war has reordered priorities. At the same time, the International Energy Agency says the war has caused severe disruption in the oil market, with flows through the Strait of Hormuz dropping sharply, while Brent crude has jumped by more than 40 percent since February 28. In such an environment, every Russian barrel that does not pass through Hormuz becomes more valuable. That is why the Financial Times spoke of additional revenues for Russia of up to $150 million a day as a result of higher prices.
Then comes the second gain: military and political time. In this respect, Ukraine appears to have lost a large share of media attention, along with priority in arms deliveries and diplomacy. The Associated Press quoted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as saying that the next round of talks had been postponed because of the war on Iran, and that Kyiv fears for its air defense supplies. Reuters also quoted him as saying that Gulf countries had used, in just a few days, more advanced air defense missiles than Ukraine received from the United States over four years. When negotiations are delayed, stockpiles are drained, and weapons and attention are diverted to another front, the balance tilts toward Moscow even without any new breakthrough on the battlefield, because time itself begins to work in Russia’s favor.
A third Russian gain is now coming into focus as well: the erosion of cohesion in the opposing camp.
In this regard, US President Donald Trump told the Financial Times that NATO could face “a very bad future” if allies do not help the United States reopen the Strait of Hormuz. But the response was not one of firm Western unity. Instead, it was marked by hesitation, objections, and separate calculations. In the background, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas was accusing Washington of seeking to “divide Europe,” while the European Council on Foreign Relations warned that US threats of tariffs and sanctions against European countries set a dangerous precedent. Some of its researchers even argued that the Greenland crisis could destroy not only NATO but the European Union itself if Europe does not act firmly. This is precisely where the difference lies: Putin does not need a perfect alliance on paper as much as he needs an adversary that is less cohesive politically and economically. And that is exactly what the war is giving him now.
The fourth gain comes from China, through economics rather than political courtesy. The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) shows that China bought 48 percent of Russia’s crude oil exports from December 2022 through the end of February 2026, and that in February alone it remained the world’s largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels, accounting for 52 percent of Russia’s export revenues among the five biggest importers. By contrast, the International Energy Agency says that 80 percent of the oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, and nearly 90 percent of the liquefied natural gas shipped through it, goes to Asia. Therefore, the more complicated Gulf supplies become, the more important Russian barrels heading east become, and China turns into a major outlet for absorbing Russian revenues. This picture is made even clearer by the fact that Trump himself has begun pressing Beijing to help reopen Hormuz, meaning Washington has found itself in a moment where it needs China on an issue that ultimately serves Russia’s interests even more.
On top of that, another factor stands out, no less important than the others: some Europeans are once again raising Russia, however reluctantly, as part of the energy solution. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described any return to Russian fossil fuels as a “strategic mistake,” saying that just 10 days of war had cost European taxpayers an additional €3 billion in fossil fuel imports. This statement did not come out of nowhere, because this debate has in fact resurfaced inside Europe, and because Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever called for normalizing relations with Russia in order to restore cheap energy. The mere return of such talk from within Europe means that Putin has succeeded in breaking part of the narrative the West tried to entrench since 2022.
For all these reasons, the issue is not that Putin has won a war in which he did not directly participate, but that he has emerged from it as a strategic and economic winner at the same time. If the war on Iran continues, or if its effects on energy, alliances, and weapons supplies persist, the question will no longer be how Putin benefited from this war, but rather to what extent it has allowed Russia to recover what it lost politically through the gateway of energy, liquidity, and the redistribution of international pressure—that is, through the logic of geopolitical economics, not through the battlefield alone.
Photo: The source
* This article was first published on March 17, 2026, in the Lebanese outlet Al Joumhouria, in Arabic language and translated to English by The Levant Files. This republication does not represent the official editorial line of The Levant Files.