UK Approves Use of British Bases for US Strikes on Iranian Sites Targeting Strait of Hormuz: What It Means for Cyprus

The United Kingdom announced on Friday that it has approved the use of its military bases for US strikes on Iranian sites targeting the Strait of Hormuz, marking a significant broadening of Britain’s role in the ongoing US-Israel-Iran conflict. The decision, taken during a ministerial meeting, expands the terms under which American forces may operate from RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire and the Diego Garcia facility in the Indian Ocean, both of which had previously been authorised only for “defensive” operations against missile facilities threatening British personnel and regional allies.

Downing Street stressed that “the principles behind the UK’s approach to the conflict remain the same,” insisting that British forces would not be directly involved in the strikes and that the expanded permission covers “US defensive operations” targeting capabilities used to attack shipping in the Strait. Ministers also “underlined the need for urgent de-escalation and a swift resolution to the war.” Nevertheless, the decision represents a clear shift from the government’s initial posture at the outbreak of hostilities on 28 February, when Prime Minister Keir Starmer explicitly withheld permission for the use of UK bases in offensive operations.

The announcement came shortly after President Donald Trump branded NATO allies “cowards” for failing to help secure the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world’s oil transits. Trump had repeatedly singled out the UK for criticism, declaring that Starmer was “no Winston Churchill” and that Britain—once “the Rolls-Royce of allies”—had been “disappointing.” Reacting to the UK’s decision, Trump described it as a “very late response,” adding: “They should have acted a lot faster.”

Iran’s response was immediate and unequivocal. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi warned that “Mr Starmer is putting British lives in danger by allowing UK bases to be used for aggression against Iran,” adding that Tehran would “exercise its right to self-defence.” The Iranian government had already characterised the earlier, more limited use of British bases as “participation in aggression.”

The domestic reaction in the UK was equally sharp. Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch called the decision the “mother of all U-turns,” while the Liberal Democrats accused the government of being “drawn further and further down Trump’s slippery slope” and called for a parliamentary vote on the terms of the agreement. The Greens echoed the demand, describing the move as “another worrying escalation.”

The Cyprus Dimension: Sovereign Bases in the Crosshairs?

While the UK’s announcement explicitly references RAF Fairford and Diego Garcia, the decision raises serious questions for Cyprus, home to two British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs)—Akrotiri (Western SBA) and Dhekelia (Eastern SBA)—which together constitute approximately 3% of the island’s territory. The SBAs have long served as a critical staging ground for British and allied military operations in the Middle East, including during the 2003 Iraq War and the 2014–2018 campaign against ISIS. RAF Akrotiri, in particular, hosts intelligence-gathering infrastructure and has been used for aerial operations across the Eastern Mediterranean.

Although the SBAs were not named in Friday’s announcement, the broadening of the terms under which British bases may be used by US forces inevitably places Cyprus in a more exposed position. The island lies barely 300 kilometres from the Syrian and Lebanese coasts and within operational range of Iranian ballistic and cruise missile systems, a fact underscored by Iran’s demonstrated willingness to strike regional targets during the current conflict. Tehran’s characterisation of any UK base involvement as “participation in aggression” does not distinguish between bases on the British mainland and those on sovereign territory abroad.

For the Republic of Cyprus, this presents an acute dilemma. Nicosia has no authority over the SBAs and no formal say in their operational use, yet any military escalation involving the bases would have immediate consequences for the island’s civilian population, economy, tourism sector, and regional diplomatic standing. The risk of becoming collateral in a conflict between major powers—precisely because of a colonial-era territorial arrangement over which Cyprus exercises no sovereignty—represents the sharpest edge of the SBA question, one that has recurrently surfaced in Cypriot political discourse but never with such urgency.

As the conflict enters its fourth week with oil prices hovering around $109 a barrel and some 20,000 seafarers stranded in the Gulf, the stakes extend well beyond the Strait of Hormuz. For a small island state in the Eastern Mediterranean, the widening footprint of the war is no longer a distant concern—it is a matter of immediate national security.