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Hezbollah IEDs Claim Two Israeli Reservists as Group Shifts to Guerrilla Warfare

Two Israeli reserve soldiers were killed and twelve others wounded in two separate roadside bomb attacks in southern Lebanon, Israeli military censors confirmed Sunday morning, reviving fears of an insurgency-style campaign that haunted Israeli forces during their occupation of Lebanon in the 1980s and 1990s.

According to Israeli defence analyst Avi Ashkenazi, writing in Maariv (19 April 2026), the fallen soldiers were identified as Staff Sergeant Barak Kalfon and Staff Sergeant Lidor Porat. The attacks, which occurred on Saturday evening and Sunday morning respectively, underscore a significant tactical shift by Hezbollah away from conventional defensive engagements.

Ashkenazi notes that over the past six weeks, Hezbollah has largely avoided direct confrontation with advancing Israeli Defence Forces, retreating or withdrawing from most positions rather than holding ground. The group's leader, Naim Qassem — who remains alive and operational despite public threats by Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz — last week confirmed the strategic realignment. "When the opportunity presents itself, we will capture enemy soldiers," Qassem said, adding that his fighters had "rebuilt themselves quietly and with ambiguity," operating through a method of advance and withdrawal rather than holding fixed geographic positions.

Ashkenazi warns that these words must be taken seriously. Hezbollah is, at its core, a guerrilla organisation, and Lebanon's terrain — dense vegetation, difficult topography and frequent low-visibility fog — provides significant operational advantages for concealed bomb placement. The group employs several types of improvised explosive devices, most notably the kela (an anti-armour directional mine) and the kilimgor (an anti-personnel variant), both of which can be detonated from a distance, severely limiting defensive countermeasures.

The Maariv analysis points out that a portion of the five IDF divisions currently manoeuvring in Lebanon are not travelling in armoured vehicles, due to a combination of operational priorities and budgetary constraints — a vulnerability that Hezbollah appears ready to exploit.

Ashkenazi argues that the IDF will need to adapt swiftly: expanding surveillance networks, establishing regularly swept secured routes, deploying greater numbers of armoured vehicles, and modifying the movement patterns of ground forces operating in open terrain.

The latest casualties serve as a stark reminder that Israel's return to southern Lebanon carries echoes of a conflict its soldiers once called the "Lebanese mud" — and that Hezbollah, diminished but not defeated, has not forgotten how it was fought before.

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