As the guns continue to roar over Iran, a paradox is emerging at the heart of the US-Iran confrontation: Tehran appears to be holding a stronger hand than at any point since the war began, yet finds itself with no credible interlocutor willing — or able — to meet its terms.
Writing in Haaretz, veteran Middle East analyst Zvi Bar'el cuts through the fog of competing narratives to expose what may be the defining contradiction of this conflict. Despite declaring that the war's military objectives are nearing completion, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has made clear that the real goal now is to "compel Iran to realize that this new regime is in a better place if they make a deal" — an acknowledgment that Washington has shifted from military conquest to coercive diplomacy.
But diplomacy requires a willing partner on both ends. And that, Bar'el argues, is precisely what is missing.
Goals Abandoned, Leverage Surrendered
In the weeks since strikes began, President Donald Trump has quietly walked back the very justifications used to launch the war. On the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Trump declared it was no longer an American problem, stating: "That'll be for France. That'll be for whoever's using the strait." Meanwhile, on Iran's stockpile of 60 percent-enriched uranium, the president said he no longer thinks about it, suggesting the material is deeply buried and could simply be monitored.
As Bar'el observes in Haaretz, with Hormuz delegated to others, the nuclear stockpile deprioritized, and the "old regime" rebranded as a "new" one by presidential decree, one is left asking what exactly Washington intends to negotiate over.
Europe Steps In — With Empty Hands
Into this vacuum, European and Arab nations are attempting to fashion a diplomatic off-ramp. Foreign ministers from 35 countries, including European and Arab states, convened in a mass conference call to explore pathways toward reopening the Strait. Yet Bar'el is blunt about the limits of their reach.
Iran has set two core preconditions for any talks. The first is a binding guarantee against future military attack — a commitment that only the United States and Israel can credibly offer, and which neither appears prepared to give. The second is the complete removal of sanctions, which European signatories to the 2015 nuclear agreement are structurally unable to deliver, particularly after activating the snapback mechanism last September.
A previous European attempt to establish a sanctions-bypassing mechanism to encourage business with Iran collapsed because companies consistently chose access to American markets over access to Iranian ones. There is little reason to believe a new attempt would fare differently.
Iran's Strong Hand, Weak Table
Paradoxically, the Islamic Republic emerges from the conflict in a position of unexpected leverage. Iran is now demanding restitution for war damages, recognition of its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz — potentially modeled on Turkey's internationally recognized control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles under the 1936 Montreux Convention — and an unqualified right to enrich uranium on its own soil.
These are maximalist demands. But as Bar'el notes in Haaretz, Iran has earned the right to make them, having survived a sustained military campaign while keeping its ideology, institutions, and chain of command largely intact. Tehran has been firmly denying that any negotiations have taken place or that it has requested them, even as Trump claims talks are ongoing — a contradiction that underscores the absence of a functioning diplomatic channel.
A Regime Without a Helmsman
Perhaps the deepest structural obstacle to any resolution is internal to Iran itself. The country is currently without a functioning supreme leader — at least one capable of wielding full authority — and a fierce internal struggle is expected to unfold between pragmatic factions within the Revolutionary Guards and ideological hardliners over how to translate the war's perceived achievements into a coherent postwar strategy.
It was, Bar'el reminds readers in Haaretz, Supreme Leader Khamenei Sr. who personally authorized both the 2015 nuclear deal and subsequent negotiations with Washington, including under Trump. Without an equivalent figure able to impose political direction, Iran's strong bargaining position may remain exactly that — a position, not a policy.
The View from the Eastern Mediterranean
For observers in Nicosia and across the region, the strategic implications are considerable. The delegitimization of the Strait of Hormuz as a US concern, Trump's threats to disengage from NATO, and the apparent sidelining of Israel as a meaningful factor in the endgame — all point to a moment of profound realignment in the architecture of regional security.
As Bar'el concludes in his analysis for Haaretz, Gulf states have already begun exploring ways to diversify their security arrangements and reduce their near-total dependence on Washington, while the global business community counts the mounting costs of prolonged disruption to vital maritime chokepoints.
Iran has the chips. The table, however, remains empty.