ONLY IN TLF:Tehran's Trump Card. Parliament Think Tank Maps Out Hormuz Chokehold as Iran's Decisive Lever in U.S. Talks
A new strategic report from the Islamic Parliament Research Center proposes four mechanisms to convert Iran's wartime control of the Strait of Hormuz into permanent diplomatic, military, and economic leverage.
In a freshly published strategic report, the Islamic Parliament Research Center has identified Iran's exclusive management of the Strait of Hormuz as the single most powerful card it holds in ongoing negotiations with the United States and has laid out four interlocking mechanisms designed to lock that advantage in for the long term.
The report, titled "Proposed Strategies for Exercising Sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz," was authored by strategist Dr. Ali Abdollahi Neysiani and international-law scholar Dr. Mohammad Saleh Taskhiri under the supervision of Hojjat al-Islam Dr. Ali Nahavandi. Citing what the authors describe as Washington's "habit of breaking commitments," it argues that of the ten conditions Iran has presented to the United States for any agreement, exclusive Iranian management of Hormuz is the one that can stand "like a firm pillar" — and serve as a guarantee for the rest.
The first and most foundational mechanism redraws the map of the strait itself. The authors divide Hormuz into two parts at Larak Island: the northern channel, which they argue lies within Iran's internal waters, and the southern channel, which runs through Iranian and Omani territorial seas. Under the 1958 and 1982 Law of the Sea conventions, a coastal state may close one route to international shipping provided it offers an alternative. The report proposes invoking the current war as legal justification to close the southern Larak route entirely and channel all traffic — commercial and military — through the northern corridor inside Iranian internal waters, where Tehran would exercise maximum sovereign authority, including inspections and tariffs.
Mechanism two extends that control outward. It calls for an integrated security alliance of the Muslim states bordering the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, with Iran at the operational center. Foreign warships from non-littoral states would be excluded; military and security management of both bodies of water would be divided strictly among coastal nations. By virtue of its coastline length and strategic depth, Iran would take more than 50 percent of the military share, the report calculates.
The third mechanism is the most economically aggressive. Rather than simply collecting transit tariffs, Iran would position itself as the exclusive buyer and reseller of every cargo, technology shipment, and energy flow passing through the strait. The authors offer a concrete illustration: with U.S. authorities currently holding oil prices near $110 a barrel by administrative fiat, Iran could nominally purchase incoming crude at the entry to Hormuz between Qeshm and Larak, and sell it back to the same vessel — some 30 to 50 kilometers later, on exit — at $200, capturing the spread. Experts cited in the report contend that pushing crude toward $250 would "dismantle the U.S. security structure from within." Iran could vary the price, currency, and terms by country and cargo at will.
The fourth mechanism reaches beyond the Gulf. It proposes leveraging Iran's chokepoint power into new transit corridors: an Iran–Armenia–Georgia route, offered in exchange for connecting Armenia to Hormuz on favorable terms; and an Iran–Iraq (via Erbil)–Syria corridor, framed as partial settlement of unpaid reparations from the 1980–88 war. Longer-term, the authors envision corridors to China via Afghanistan and to India via Kashmir, restoring Iran's historic role as a civilizational hub between East and West.
The report concludes that the four mechanisms function as a single package, with mechanism one as the indispensable foundation. Together, the authors argue, they would relieve pressure on Iranian negotiators, foreclose American attempts to dilute the outcome, and bring talks to a faster, more favorable close.