Writing in Foreign Policy, CNN host and geopolitical commentator Fareed Zakaria argues that two months into the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, the strategic balance sheet is deeply unfavourable to Washington.
Writing in Foreign Policy on 3 April, Fareed Zakaria — host of CNN's Fareed Zakaria GPS — opens with a stark assessment of what Iran actually looked like before the conflict began in late February. He notes that Iran's nuclear enrichment facilities had already been, in President Donald Trump's own words, 'completely and totally obliterated' during a twelve-day US-Israeli bombing campaign in June of last year, using stealth bombers and 30,000-pound bunker-buster bombs. Israel's Defence Forces chief had declared that Iran's nuclear project and missile programme had been set back by years.
The Islamic Republic had also been substantially weakened by earlier Israeli air campaigns in 2024, which killed key Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) leaders, destroyed air defences and struck ballistic missile facilities. Hezbollah had been crippled, several layers of its top leadership eliminated. Hamas had been dismantled in Gaza. Iranian-backed militias in Syria had been targeted, contributing to the collapse of the Assad government in December 2024.
Zakaria's conclusion, drawing on these facts, is blunt: Iran posed no meaningful threat to its neighbours — let alone to the United States — when the war began. He underscores the point by quoting Trump himself, who admitted the US doesn't 'have to be there … But we're there to help our allies.' The commentator adds pointedly that neither European nor Asian allies were consulted, and many have since spoken out against the campaign.
Regime Change the Actual Goal — and It Has Not Been Achieved
According to Zakaria's Foreign Policy analysis, reports indicate that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu persuaded Trump to launch the war not because of an imminent Iranian threat, but because Tehran's unprecedented military and economic weakness presented an opportunity to attempt regime change. He cites Trump's own opening statement, in which the president urged the Iranian people to 'rise up and overthrow the regime' — a call immediately echoed by Netanyahu.
So far, that objective has not been achieved. The Islamic Republic has not fallen. Crucially, the 86-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — who had famously issued a religious ruling banning the development of nuclear weapons — was killed and replaced by his son, described as considerably more hard-line. The IRGC, long the more militant wing of the Iranian state, appears increasingly ascendant. As Zakaria observes, such an outcome is entirely predictable in wartime: hard-liners thrive in existential conflicts.
The Strait of Hormuz: Open for Iranian Oil, Closed for the World
One of the most consequential developments Zakaria highlights in his Foreign Policy piece concerns the Strait of Hormuz. The strait — which had remained free and open through 47 years of US-Iranian tensions — is now restricted by Iran's new leadership. Trump has described these same leaders as 'much more reasonable' and predicted the strait will open naturally after further bombing runs, since Iran will want to export its own oil.
Zakaria dismantles this logic. The strait is not fully closed — it remains open to Iranian oil, which flows freely, particularly to China. The net result, he argues, is that Iran now earns approximately twice as much on its daily oil sales compared to before the war. If Tehran continues charging a reported two million dollars per passing tanker, it stands to accumulate hundreds of millions of dollars in additional monthly revenue — sufficient, the analyst argues, to rebuild its military capabilities and more.
Gulf Allies Destabilised, Regional Modernisation Jeopardised
The Foreign Policy commentary also addresses the impact on Washington's Gulf partners. According to Zakaria, America's Gulf allies now face a far more unstable and tense environment than before the war. Their economic models depend on peace, stability, and regional integration. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had invested significantly in mending ties with Iran following the 2023 Beijing-brokered rapprochement, seeking to calm geopolitical waters and create conditions for his ambitious Vision 2030 modernisation programme. Today, Zakaria writes, all that progress is at risk as oil exports are disrupted and the region has shifted from a trajectory of stability toward an arc of conflict.
Russia, China and the Broader Strategic Cost
In the broader geopolitical ledger Zakaria presents in Foreign Policy, the most obvious beneficiary of the conflict is Russia. Moscow stands to earn billions of additional dollars each month as global oil prices rise and the US waives sanctions against it. Ukraine loses as weapons it urgently needs are diverted to the Middle East. Europe, Zakaria argues, faces crushing energy costs and mounting pressure from Trump to commit NATO forces to a Middle Eastern war — despite NATO being, as the commentator notes, a defensive alliance that did not participate in Korea, Vietnam or Iraq.
China, meanwhile, gains on multiple fronts: Washington is drawn back into a Middle Eastern quagmire, losing strategic focus on Asia. Beijing's vast investments in green technology shield it from many of the war's economic costs, while it positions itself before the international community as a more responsible, less disruptive power.
A Mounting Cost With Few Gains
Fareed Zakaria closes his Foreign Policy argument with a rhetorical question: has any US military action ever accumulated so many costs for so few gains? The piece acknowledges that wars are unpredictable and things could change. But at the two-month mark, the balance sheet — a more radical Iranian leadership, a blocked shipping lane, windfall revenues for Tehran, a destabilised Gulf, a distracted America and an emboldened Russia and China — does not, in his assessment, favour Washington.