The interim government in Damascus is keeping an estimated 5,000 foreign fighters under arms inside Syria’s new security apparatus, a strategy that has eased the post‑Assad transition but is stirring deep unease at home and abroad. The policy, detailed in a recent commentary by the International Crisis Group, describes how Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham (HTS) and its allies integrated non‑Syrian militants into the regular army after the regime’s collapse in late 2024, banking on them as a disciplined reserve force even as many Syrians fear an entrenched jihadist influence in state institutions.
In the months following the fall of Bashar al‑Assad, HTS offered foreign and Syrian factions a stark choice: fold into the new army hierarchy or face arrest, a move that brought once‑autonomous formations such as the Uighur‑dominated Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) under formal state command. While fighters now wear Syrian army uniforms and operate within numbered divisions, many units have preserved internal chains of command, with TIP brigades, Uzbek contingents and other foreign groups functioning as cohesive blocs inside the armed forces. President Ahmad al‑Sharaa has gone further by assigning key security portfolios to foreign commanders, including a Jordanian heading the Republican Guard and a Turkish commander leading the Damascus Division, decisions that critics say underline the political weight of these wartime allies.
Foreign partners have largely chosen pragmatism, rolling back sanctions on HTS and engaging the new authorities even as they keep terrorist designations on some foreign factions and commanders. Washington has sent mixed signals: President Donald Trump publicly listed the removal of “foreign terrorists” from Syria as a priority, yet his envoy later tacitly endorsed the creation of the 84th Division, a unit composed almost entirely of TIP fighters, as a “transparent” way to contain them within the army. The US Congress has added pressure by requiring periodic certification that Damascus is taking steps to reduce the number of foreign fighters in government ranks, creating a recurring test of Syria’s counter‑terrorism credentials.
China, long the most vocal critic of Uighur militants in Syria, initially resisted HTS’s rehabilitation but softened its stance after securing assurances that Syrian territory would not be used to threaten Chinese security. Beijing signalled its discomfort by abstaining on a key UN Security Council resolution lifting sanctions on Syria’s leadership, then dropped objections to removing HTS from the UN terror list once Damascus offered detailed counter‑terrorism guarantees. European capitals, notably France, have prioritised cooperation with Damascus on foreign fighters while showing little appetite to repatriate their own nationals, and Russia appears to treat the issue as secondary in its dealings with the new authorities.
Inside Syria, the continued prominence of foreign legions is fuelling anxiety among secular communities and minorities who bore the brunt of violence after the regime’s fall. Foreign fighters took part in the brutal suppression of Assad‑loyalist revolts on the coast and the Druze uprising in Suweida in 2025, episodes in which UN investigators documented abuses against civilians that reinforced fears of an Islamist and sectarian drift under al‑Sharaa’s rule. Although army discipline has improved in more recent operations, such as the government’s seizure of former SDF‑held zones with fewer civilian casualties, many Syrians still view the security sector as a loosely controlled patchwork of ex‑rebels, some with unresolved jihadist sympathies.
Security officials acknowledge that most foreign units, particularly the TIP, have so far obeyed government orders and even relinquished long‑held properties in Idlib to returning families, sometimes more readily than Syrian factions backed by Türkiye. Yet other contingents, especially some Uzbek groups, have shown “mafia‑like” behaviour, with one recent incident in Idlib seeing armed comrades surround a security headquarters to demand the release of an arrested fighter, forcing the state to reassert authority with a sweep of arrests days later. The December 2025 killing of three US military personnel by a Syrian security officer suspected of ISIS ties further exposed how a security apparatus built on rebel networks can be vulnerable to infiltration and rogue actors.
Analysts warn that ISIS, which brands al‑Sharaa’s pragmatic governance and participation in the anti‑ISIS coalition as heretical, is actively trying to recruit among disaffected ex‑rebels now serving in state structures. A heavy‑handed crackdown on foreign fighters or attempts to forcibly expel them could backfire, driving individuals into ISIS’s arms or triggering lone‑wolf attacks that, while unlikely to threaten the government’s grip on power, would carry enormous symbolic weight. The political risk is that every abuse or defection by a foreign fighter reinforces the narrative that Damascus prioritises its former jihadist allies over the safety of ordinary Syrians.
Beyond the battlefield, foreign fighters maintain influence through schools, cultural centres and religious institutions that operate on the margins of state oversight, especially in Idlib, where dozens of Uighur centres combine communal life with religious teaching and, in some cases, military‑style training. International partners and local critics fear that such spaces could transmit hardline ideology to a new generation if they remain outside the formal education system. Crisis Group suggests bringing these institutions under direct state supervision and aligning their curricula with national standards as a way to curb radicalisation while preserving room for Uighur cultural and religious expression.
The report outlines several incremental steps Damascus could take to defuse the “foreign legions” time‑bomb without dismantling the integration framework that has helped stabilise the country. These include gradually replacing foreigners in the most sensitive command posts with trusted Syrians, expanding channels for international counter‑terrorism cooperation, and reforming nationality laws so Syrian women can pass citizenship to foreign spouses and children, creating a legal route to naturalise vetted fighters and their families. Over time, the authorities are urged to dilute foreign‑majority formations, fold individuals into mixed units, and eventually pursue broader demobilisation and civilian reintegration as security conditions improve.
For now, the al‑Sharaa government appears determined to preserve the status quo, convinced that the cost of keeping foreign fighters in uniform is lower than the risks of disbanding them. Whether this gamble pays off will depend not only on Damascus’s willingness to implement gradual reforms, but also on how patiently Washington, Beijing and European capitals judge its progress on neutralising Syria’s most controversial soldiers.