The same model foresees a seven‑party chamber in which DISY and AKEL take 14 seats each, ELAM nine, Odysseas Michaelides’ ALMA six, Fidias Panayiotou’s Direct Democracy (Amesi Dimokratía) five, DIKO six, and Volt two. A separate Alpha–Rai poll, reported by Cyprus Mail, similarly forecasts ELAM in third place with nine MPs, more than doubling the four it secured in 2021, while DIKO slumps to its worst result in the party’s 50‑year history.
Recent polling underlines just how narrow the race has become at the top – and how solid ELAM’s foothold is beneath it. A March poll by Rai for Alpha showed DISY on 14.3%, AKEL on 13.6%, and ELAM in a clear third place on 10.3%, with newer formations such as ALMA and Direct Democracy in mid‑single digits and DIKO pushed down to sixth. An April survey for Politis found DISY and AKEL again essentially tied, while ELAM hovered around 10% overall and climbed to 13.4% among decided voters, confirming its status as a double‑digit force.
Founded in 2008, ELAM has long been described by academics and rights groups as an ultranationalist, neo‑fascist organisation that drew ideological and organisational inspiration from Golden Dawn, even as it has sought in recent years to soften its image and present itself as a more “respectable” nationalist right. It campaigns for a hard‑line “liberation” solution to the Cyprus problem, rejects a bizonal, bicommunal federation, and marries uncompromising national rhetoric with anti‑immigrant, welfare‑chauvinist positions – demanding “Greeks first” access to jobs and benefits and stricter controls at the Green Line.
The party’s rise is fuelled by a combustible mix of anger over corruption scandals, frustration with stalled reunification talks, and deep anxiety over migration and the cost of living. Analysts note that ELAM has been especially adept at tapping into the fallout from the 2013 financial crisis and the discrediting of the “golden passports” scheme, portraying itself as the only force willing to confront both domestic elites and Brussels.
Migration has become ELAM’s most potent mobilising issue. Although asylum applications have fallen sharply – from more than 17,000 in 2022 to just a few thousand last year – the party continues to frame Cyprus as being under “demographic siege”, and a recent Eurobarometer cited by Politis showed 86% of Cypriots viewing irregular migration as a major problem, one of the highest levels in the EU. ELAM has demanded the closure of crossing points along the ceasefire line to block asylumseekers from the north and accuses mainstream parties of “sacrificing national identity” to EU obligations.
The unresolved Cyprus problem is another driver. With negotiations frozen since the collapse of talks at Crans‑Montana in 2017 and no breakthrough on the horizon, hard‑line narratives that reject compromise and call instead for “liberation” have gained ground, particularly among younger Greek Cypriots who have never seen serious progress towards a settlement. ELAM and other ultra‑nationalist groups argue that the political establishment has “forgotten” the goal of reversing the Turkish occupation and depict diplomatic efforts at a bizonal federation as capitulation.
This mood is playing out against an increasingly fragmented party system. There are now 19 party lists and 753 candidates contesting the 2026 election – roughly “one party per 21,000 voters”, as one recent analysis put it – with several new formations vying for disillusioned and anti‑system voters. Social‑media‑driven movements such as Direct Democracy and ALMA are competing directly with ELAM for protest votes, but the far‑right party’s longer organising history and clear ideological profile give it an advantage in consolidating its base.
Beyond ELAM, the ultra‑nationalist spectrum on the Greek‑Cypriot side is thickening, even if smaller groups appear to have little chance of entering parliament. The Patriotic Front “Lakedaimonioi” is running a tiny slate centred on a platform of “liberation”, anti‑migration, joint defence with Greece, and a fierce defence of Orthodoxy and the traditional family – a cocktail that mirrors far‑right trends elsewhere in Europe. The Democratic National Movement (DEK), led by former DISY and ELAM MP Andreas Themistocleous, offers a similar blend of nationalist and anti‑“woke” conservatism, but is also polling far below the 3.5% threshold.
None of these smaller actors currently register in national votingintention surveys, yet their presence contributes to normalising hardline rhetoric and pushing the political debate rightwards on issues from migration to the Cyprus talks. With just weeks to go, roughly a quarter of voters remain undecided in some polls – a reminder that nothing is settled – but the trajectory is clear: a far‑right party with roots in neo‑Nazi networks is now poised not only to double its parliamentary strength, but to anchor the new political equilibrium in Nicosia.
Photo: Kathimerini Cyprus