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Pakistan's War On The Taliban: Can Kabul's Regime Be Changed?

Writing in the CACI Analyst (Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 31 March 2026), Karachi-based analyst and Wikistrat fellow Syed Fazl-e-Haider argues that Pakistan's military campaign against the Taliban carries a regime-change agenda — but one that cannot succeed without a precise set of conditions being met.

The writer stresses that on February 26, Pakistan launched Operation Ghazab lil-Haq — "Righteous Fury" — striking major Afghan cities including Kabul with airstrikes. While Islamabad officially frames the campaign as pressure on the Taliban to halt cross-border militant attacks, Fazl-e-Haider writes that the operation doubles as a signal: regime change in Kabul is now on the table.

Why Regime Change Has Become a Priority

Since the Taliban's return to power in 2021, Afghanistan has effectively become a sanctuary for militant groups. Pakistan has suffered repeated attacks from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), both operating from Afghan soil with near-impunity.

China, sharing a 47-mile border with Afghanistan, is alarmed by the presence of Uyghur separatists and anti-Beijing networks sheltering under Taliban protection — despite assurances to the contrary. Russia, meanwhile, has estimated that Afghanistan hosts between 20,000 and 23,000 militants, with up to 7,000 linked to the TTP, and released that assessment just two days before Pakistan's strikes began — a timing widely read as implicit political endorsement.

The Conditions Pakistan Must Meet

Fazl-e-Haider identifies a clear set of prerequisites for any viable regime-change effort. First and foremost, China's backing is indispensable. Beijing has publicly called for restraint and a ceasefire, but Pakistan's military campaign is widely believed to carry tacit Chinese approval, given shared frustration over Taliban inaction against militant networks.

Second, Tajikistan's involvement is critical. The country hosts the leadership of the National Resistance Front (NRF), the main anti-Taliban opposition force led by Ahmad Massoud, son of the legendary commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. Pakistan's strikes could create openings for the NRF and other opposition groups to erode Taliban control from within.

Third, control of the Wakhan Corridor — a narrow 350-kilometre strip of northeastern Afghanistan connecting China's Xinjiang to Tajikistan — must be secured. For Pakistan, holding the corridor would provide direct access to Tajikistan and Central Asia, bypassing Taliban-controlled territory. For China, it is a strategic node under the Belt and Road Initiative.

The Stakes Beyond Kabul

A successful transition in Kabul would unlock billions of dollars in stalled regional connectivity — including a proposed $4.8 billion Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan railway and the long-delayed $10 billion TAPI gas pipeline linking Turkmenistan to India. Conversely, a prolonged conflict risks pushing these projects into indefinite delay.

Pakistan, the analyst concludes, is betting that Taliban-ruled Afghanistan has become an intolerable security liability for enough regional powers to make a coordinated regime-change effort viable — but the alignment of Islamabad, Beijing, and Dushanbe remains the decisive variable.

Illustration: Perplexity