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Salafi Commanders Rise to Power in Yemen's Military Landscape

A quiet but significant transformation is reshaping Yemen's military command structure: Salafi commanders, once confined to mosques and religious outreach, are now holding senior leadership positions across the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)-controlled governorates, backed by Saudi Arabia's strategic and financial support.

According to the Middle East Eye, gawed, a 43-year-old Salafi preacher from Lahj governorate, embodies this shift. Before 2015, he traveled between mosques teaching a strictly apolitical interpretation of Islam — a tradition inherited from Salafi scholar Muqbil al-Wadi'i, who established a religious centre in Dammaj, Saada, in the 1980s. When the Houthis advanced into Lahj, Gawed and his followers took up arms. "We didn't fight for political reasons; we fought to protect our lands and our faith from the Houthis as they tried to invade our villages and distort Islam," he told Middle East Eye.

The Salafi movement's path to military prominence traces back through years of violent confrontation with the Houthis — adherents of the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam. In October 2013, Houthi forces besieged the Salafi centre of Dar al-Hadith in Dammaj, leaving more than 250 dead. By 2014, Salafis were expelled from the centre entirely, scattering to governorates including Lahj. The Houthis subsequently advanced on Sanaa, eventually seizing control of approximately 30 percent of Yemen's territory.

The pivotal year came in 2023, when Saudi Arabia backed the formation of the National Shield Forces (NSF) under exclusive Salafi leadership within the PLC framework. The NSF proved decisive during tensions between the PLC and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC), displacing STC influence across Hadhramout, Shabwa, Abyan, and eventually Aden.

"Saudi Arabia took this step in 2023 when it felt it had almost no other reliable forces on the ground to support its interests," political analyst Mohammed Sultan told Middle East Eye. By that point, the STC and the Republican Guard were aligned with the UAE, while the Islah party was no longer viewed as loyal to Riyadh — leaving Salafis as the only dependable Saudi-aligned faction on the ground.

The ascent reached a new milestone on 30 April 2026, when PLC chairman Rashad al-Alimi appointed Salafi Brigadier General Hamdi Shukri as Commander of the Fourth Military Region, covering the strategic hubs of Aden, Lahj, Taiz, Abyan, and parts of al-Dhale.

Officials inside the Defence Ministry are urging caution about the sectarian framing of these appointments. "We are all Yemenis, and we fight to liberate Yemen from the Iran-backed militia," a ministry source told MEE on condition of anonymity, stressing that promotions should be based on skill and loyalty to the country — not religious affiliation.

Yet analysts warn of long-term consequences. "We are seeing political and military positions divided based on loyalty rather than proficiency," Sultan cautioned. "If a reconciliation with the Houthis is reached or the war ends, establishing a civil state will be extremely difficult".

For now, Gawed and his fellow commanders press on, convinced their faith and discipline will carry Yemen to what they call "liberation." As the Yemeni army continues restructuring under a unified PLC command, the Salafis' role — and Saudi Arabia's hand behind it — will remain a defining feature of Yemen's fractured military map.

Photo: Source

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