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At first glance, the regional picture looks bleak for any breakthrough on Cyprus. Ankara has not moved from its insistence on a two-state framework — effectively the permanent partition of the island. In the Aegean, Greece and Turkey are again trading warnings, and the Turkish parliament is preparing legislation to entrench the "Blue Motherland" maritime doctrine. Against that backdrop, it is fair to ask whether anything positive can realistically emerge in the near term.
The answer is a cautious yes — but the gains on offer are practical rather than political. The most plausible positive development is not a settlement of the constitutional question, which remains frozen, but a thickening of the day-to-day contacts that keep the two communities connected and the diplomatic process technically alive.
That window is being opened by UN envoy María Ángela Holguín. In tandem with her island visit, both leaders signalled they want to keep the process moving and prepare for "next steps." President Nikos Christodoulides said he was ready to continue efforts and that "it is time for political decisions," hoping a three-way meeting during Holguín's visit would clarify how she intends to proceed. Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman struck a results-oriented note, arguing the visit should "yield concrete results" and create the right atmosphere for a solution, with technical-level work accelerated beforehand.
The gap between the two lines is itself instructive. Christodoulides wants political decisions; Erhürman wants tangible deliverables. Where those two demands overlap is exactly where progress is achievable: confidence-building measures that require neither side to concede on sovereignty. The files repeatedly mentioned — new crossing points, the Halloumi/Hellim geographical-indication arrangement, and water-pipeline cooperation — are precisely the kind of low-politics wins that can be banked without prejudging the final status.
New crossing points would ease daily movement and trade across the Green Line. A resolved Halloumi/Hellim file would channel EU-backed economic benefit to both communities. Water and infrastructure arrangements address a shared resource problem that partition only worsens. None of these require Ankara to abandon its two-state language or Athens and Ankara to settle the Aegean — which is why they can advance even as the maximalist positions harden elsewhere.
There is also a structural reason for guarded optimism. Christodoulides has tied the Cyprus track to a "new dynamic" linked to EU-related developments, hinting that European leverage and the prospect of an enlarged informal meeting could give both sides incentives to show goodwill. Holguín, for her part, has drawn a clear line: a larger 5+1 summit depends on tangible progress first. That sequencing rewards incremental, verifiable steps over grand gestures.
So the realistic "positive development" on Cyprus's horizon is a tripartite meeting followed, if it goes well, by an enlarged informal gathering — producing a modest package of confidence-building measures. It will not reunify the island. But in a period defined by partition rhetoric and Aegean brinkmanship, keeping the channel open and delivering concrete humanitarian and economic wins would itself be a meaningful achievement — and the foundation any future political settlement will need.