Gofman, the first outsider to lead Israel’s premier spy agency since 2011, assumed office on June 2, 2026, after a contentious High Court battle over his appointment, and has since moved aggressively to sideline veterans loyal to his predecessor David Barnea while bringing in a cadre of outside advisers to reshape Mossad’s Iran policy. The Jerusalem Post reported that Gofman has already pushed out Barnea’s deputy and installed his own team, signaling a break with the previous leadership’s cautious, insider‑driven approach.
His arrival coincides with renewed geopolitical maneuvering in the Washington–Tel Aviv–Ankara triangle over how to exploit Kurdish discontent inside Iran. In February 2026, anti‑regime Kurdish organizations inside Iran formed the “Coalition of Political Forces in Iranian Kurdistan,” outlining plans to administer Kurdish‑majority areas if Tehran’s regime collapses. U.S. and Israeli officials have since debated whether to arm and train these groups as part of a broader campaign to destabilize the Islamic Republic.
Under Barnea, Mossad had already prepared a bold Kurdish‑centric operation: Israel was reportedly ready to provide Kurdish forces with a continuous aerial “firepower envelope” and a no‑fly zone to shield their advance against Iranian troops, using weapons captured from Hamas and Hezbollah and retasked for Iran. But the plan was vetoed at the last minute by then‑President Donald Trump, amid fierce lobbying from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who views Kurdish autonomy movements as a direct threat to Turkish security.
Now, Gofman is revisiting that blueprint with a more aggressive, politically‑connected style. Israeli sources say he views Barnea’s Iran strategy as insufficiently decisive and is pushing Mossad to integrate Kurdish operations more tightly with U.S. and Turkish calculations, even as Ankara remains wary of Kurdish empowerment.
“The end of the Iranian regime will come, and we will help it reach that destination,” Gofman declared in his inaugural speech, echoing Netanyahu’s vow to “remove Iran’s regime from the world.” Unlike Barnea, who relied heavily on Mossad veterans, Gofman has brought in five outside advisers with strong security backgrounds to dominate internal debates, according to Israeli media reports.
The Trump administration, meanwhile, has warned Iran not to rebuild its nuclear program after the 2025 Israel–Iran war, and U.S. officials are weighing material support for Iranian Kurdish groups to further weaken Tehran’s grip. That has set off a delicate diplomatic dance: Washington wants to keep Turkey inside the NATO fold, Ankara wants to curb Kurdish autonomy, and Israel sees Kurdish unrest as a low‑cost lever to pressure the regime.
Gofman’s Mossad is now at the heart of that triangle, recalibrating covert operations, propaganda campaigns, and military support to Kurdish factions in a bid to turn Iran’s periphery into its Achilles’ heel. Critics warn that empowering Kurdish groups risks fragmenting Iran and inflaming regional tensions, but Gofman appears willing to bet that a more muscular, outsider‑driven Mossad can manage those risks—and finally deliver on Israel’s long‑standing promise to bring down the Islamic Republic.