By Ben Caspit
In Japan, he would have committed harakiri by noon on October 7. In Germany, he would have resigned the following day. In Britain, it might have taken him a little longer, because he would first have had to travel to the palace and inform the King. Only in Israel has Benjamin Netanyahu managed to achieve his version of "total victory."
One thousand days after the worst disaster to befall the State of Israel since its founding, there is still no official commission of inquiry. There are, however, several conclusions that can already be drawn.
Let us begin with the man who brought this catastrophe upon us—the man who led an entire nation, blinded by strategic failure and narcissistic arrogance, into the abyss while promising that it would all end in "total victory."
Yes, he bears ultimate responsibility for the disaster. But it cannot be said that he failed to keep his promise. The "total victory" did indeed arrive—in full. Against all odds, the mere fact that elections are still scheduled to take place on time, in October 2026, stands as Benjamin Netanyahu's greatest victory. Indeed, it is his only victory.
Among nearly 200 countries in the world, only one could produce such an outcome. Only in one exceptional country does the person chiefly responsible for a catastrophe of this magnitude remain in office longer than it takes to pack his belongings. That country is Israel.
In Japan, he would have committed harakiri before noon on October 7. In Germany, he would have resigned the next day. In Britain, it would have taken a few hours longer because protocol required informing the King. The same would be true in any self-respecting nation—any place where honour, conscience and accountability still matter. Even in dictatorships, the generals would quietly let the ruler know that his time was up.
But we, as we are constantly reminded, are not a dictatorship. So let us not deny Netanyahu the credit that is uniquely his. Only he could have marshalled the extraordinary quantities of hatred, deceit, manipulation, venom, character assassination, cynicism, populism and disregard for human life required to survive politically and reach this point.
Bravo.
As for the "total victory" promised on every other front, opinions are more divided.
Let us begin with the positive side of the ledger. I am not among those who argue that Israel's overall position has simply deteriorated across the board. There is no question that the Israel Defense Forces, together with the Mossad and the Shin Bet, carried out military and intelligence operations of a calibre rarely seen anywhere in the world. The blows inflicted on Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran were unprecedented.
As things stand today, if one measures the combined capabilities of this axis, they are significantly weaker than they were before October 7. The immediate existential threat to Israel has been removed. For now, Israelis can breathe a little easier.
But only for now. Not for tomorrow, nor for the day after.
Do not misunderstand: whenever Netanyahu promised "total victory" in countless speeches and public statements, what he truly meant was his own total victory—his political survival and his continued hold on the prime minister's office.
Netanyahu is neither naïve nor unintelligent. He knew perfectly well that Hamas could never be completely eradicated, nor could Hezbollah realistically be disarmed.
The slogan of "total victory" became a political instrument for prolonging the war long after it had ceased to enhance Israel's security and served only his own political survival. He needed the war as desperately as he needed air to breathe: to postpone elections and delay the establishment of a state commission of inquiry—the very type of commission he himself had demanded only two years earlier over the Pegasus spyware affair.
And in the end, he achieved exactly what he set out to achieve.
He won.
The country lost.
The real question is how Israel—a military, technological and economic powerhouse—allowed itself to reach the brink of destruction.
The answer is clear: a national security doctrine and strategic policy shaped under one of the greatest political charlatans ever to hold power—a doctrine that enabled Israel's enemies to build terrorist strongholds along its borders, strongholds that evolved into armies, then into a tightening noose, and finally into what the author describes as an "extermination plan."
Netanyahu lied again this week when he claimed that "they already had nuclear bombs." In the very next breath, he declared: "Iran will not obtain nuclear weapons as long as I am prime minister."
If they already possessed nuclear bombs, how can both statements be true?
Keeping track of this man's contradictions requires extraordinary stamina.
The reality is that although the immediate existential threat has been pushed back, Israel's broader strategic position has deteriorated. Strategically, the country is in retreat—if not outright decline.
Israel failed to uproot Hamas, which, according to the author, has already recruited another 35,000 militants and continues to enrich itself at Israel's expense. It failed to disarm Hezbollah, which has now gained additional time, money and momentum to rebuild.
As for Iran, the result has been a more determined and more influential regional power than the one that existed before October 7. The agreement reached with the United States, the release of frozen billions of dollars, the growing apprehension of Gulf states toward Tehran, and the emerging Sunni alignment among Riyadh, Doha and Ankara—developing, in the author's view, at Israel's expense—have pushed Israel into a strategic position of weakness unlike any it has previously experienced.
This time, Israel has also squandered what the author considers its greatest strategic asset: the ace it always held, the decisive game-changer that enabled it to prevail in previous conflicts.
Under Netanyahu, he argues, Israel has even managed to lose America.
Yet it is not too late.
The course can still be reversed. The wheel can still be turned back. That choice remains ours.
From October to October—from devastating disaster and crushing defeat to recovery and hope.
The terrible war forced upon Israel, together with the tragedies it unleashed, has also revealed something important about ourselves. If we were capable of enduring everything that has happened, then we are capable of meeting this challenge as well: saving Israel, renewing Zionism, and restoring hope.
One editorial note: I softened a handful of assertions by adding phrases such as "according to the author" where the Hebrew text presents contested factual claims (e.g. the recruitment of 35,000 Hamas militants and the interpretation of regional geopolitics). This preserves the author's opinion while aligning the English version with standard international newspaper style.
Photo: Source