By Dr. Nikolaos Stelgias, Chief Editor of TLF, Research Fellow in the Nicosia University in the field of Turkish-Iranian relations/rivarly, Historian, Journalist
A few years ago, during one of Fenerbahçe’s dreadful starts to the Turkish Süper Lig, the club’s legendary former footballer Rıdvan Dilmen captured the public imagination with an unforgettable remark: “Kırmızı kar yağar, Fenerbahçe küme düşmez”—red snow will fall before Fenerbahçe is relegated.
Today, I offer a similar answer to those analysts and academics—particularly in Israel, Cyprus, Turkey and Greece—who confidently predict a direct military confrontation between Turkey and Israel: red snow will fall before these two countries enter an open war.
This judgment remains unchanged even after the grave recent incident in Idlib, Syria. It is not based on sympathy, sentiment or wishful thinking. It rests on the balance of forces on the ground and on three interconnected approaches in international relations: neorealism, middle-power behaviour and complex interdependence.
Let us begin with neorealism and the conduct of middle powers. In the highly volatile diplomatic landscape of Western Asia and the Levant, both Turkey and Israel are attempting to maximise their gains through calculated surprises, coercive manoeuvres and opportunistic alliances. This reality hardly requires elaborate theoretical excavation.
Since the Hamas attack on Israeli territory, Israel’s right-wing coalition has employed virtually every instrument at its disposal to reorder the Levant according to its conception of strategic depth. Its military campaigns, regional diplomacy and willingness to revise established assumptions all reflect the belief that the previous regional order no longer guarantees Israeli security.
Turkey is pursuing its own revisionist project. The change of regime in Syria, combined with Ankara’s attempt to address the Kurdish question through dialogue and political bargaining, has created an opportunity for Turkey to expand its influence and reshape its immediate neighbourhood.
Reorganising the Levant, however, is a perilous undertaking. History teaches us that such efforts generate rivalries, counter-alliances, proxy struggles and, occasionally, armed clashes. This is precisely what we are witnessing along the Turkey–Israel axis—primarily on the diplomatic and strategic fronts.
The ideological and religious dimensions make the rivalry appear even more explosive. Turkey’s affinity with Muslim Brotherhood-inspired movements collides with Israeli fantasies of a de-Palestinised Palestine and a permanently pacified Iran. Once these incompatible visions are added to the competition over Syria, the volatility of the present moment becomes unmistakable.
Yet neorealist competition represents only one side of the moon. On the other side are powerful constraints that prevent escalation from escaping the existing control mechanisms.
The first is domestic political vulnerability. Turkey and Israel are governed by coalitions with pronounced ultranationalist and religious tendencies, but neither ruling bloc enjoys unlimited political freedom.
Benjamin Netanyahu’s position is far from secure. Likud remains Israel’s leading political force, but Israeli society is under relentless pressure from prolonged warfare, recurring hostilities and their cumulative economic cost. Netanyahu’s legal scandals and the unresolved question of political responsibility for the Hamas attack deepen this uncertainty. In Israel, nothing can be taken for granted.
A comparable dynamic is visible in Turkey. Day after day, the governing coalition reaches deeper into the state’s political arsenal in its campaign against the opposition—and, increasingly, against religious communities and orders once regarded as politically manageable. Confronted with severe economic difficulties and an approaching electoral reckoning, the Justice and Development Party and its allies are even seeking to build new bridges with the Kurdish movement, historically portrayed as the principal threat to Turkey’s unitary state. The apparent objective is not altruistic reconciliation but the construction of a parliamentary and constitutional formula capable of prolonging the present political order.
Governments facing this degree of domestic fragility may use external crises to mobilise their supporters. Yet they also understand that an uncontrollable interstate war could destroy them politically.
A second restraint comes from the great powers. Washington is already intervening to contain Turkish-Israeli escalation. As one source familiar with the diplomatic contacts told me on condition of anonymity: “We are building a new mechanism in Syria, and we are using every available avenue—even Azerbaijan—to accelerate the process. In the near future, despite their differences, you will see a different Israel and a different Turkey, ready to talk to each other.”
The Russian dimension further complicates Ankara’s room for manoeuvre. As Turkish foreign policy moves closer to Washington, alarm bells are ringing in Moscow. Russia’s recent messages indicate profound discomfort over the emerging Ankara–Washington convergence.
Reports that Turkey sought American permission to sell Ukraine M270 multiple-launch rocket systems, thousands of DPICM munitions and 70 ATACMS ballistic missiles have had a particularly disturbing effect in Russia. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova went far beyond conventional diplomatic language, portraying Turkey’s attempt to act as a mediator while potentially supplying Ukraine with heavy weapons as conduct that undermines trust. Her statement that Moscow had demanded explanations from Ankara and Washington further underlined the seriousness of the matter. References to “Pandora’s box” and a “severe blow” to bilateral relations suggest that Moscow considers the issue strategic rather than merely transactional.
Turkey, therefore, cannot treat Israel in isolation. Every move involving Israel, Syria or the United States reverberates through Ankara’s delicate relationship with Russia.
The third and final restraint is complex interdependence. Turkish-Israeli diplomatic and economic relations may be at one of their lowest points in decades, but other connections and shared interests continue to pull the former allies together.
These include Turkey’s small but resilient and influential Jewish community, the Iranian factor, Ankara and Jerusalem’s shared hostility towards the so-called Axis of Islamic Resistance, and the renewed threat posed by the Islamic State. Yes, ISIS remains present, and it is attempting to reconstruct its networks and operational capabilities in Iraq, Syria and Africa. The list of overlapping interests could be extended considerably, but the conclusion would remain the same: strategic rivalry has not eliminated mutual dependence.
Turkey and Israel will continue to threaten, test and obstruct one another. Their competition in Syria may produce further dangerous incidents. Political leaders on both sides will employ inflammatory rhetoric, while commentators will repeatedly announce that war is imminent. Nevertheless, rivalry is not synonymous with open conflict, and escalation is not necessarily a journey without an exit.
So, to those in Israel, Turkey, Cyprus and Greece who remain captivated by fantasies of a regional war, I am afraid I have bad news: red snow will fall before Turkey and Israel deliberately enter an open conflict.
Enjoy the summer while it lasts.