Turkey’s intensifying rivalry with Israel and growing instability across the Middle East have driven Ankara into a new defence alliance with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, although the arrangement risks entangling it in its partners’ conflicts and complicating its NATO obligations.
As Al-Monitor correspondent Barin Kayaoglu reported on August 16, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced the trilateral pact in Mecca on August 7. Its collective-defence provision states that an armed attack against one signatory will be considered an attack against all three.
The language resembles NATO’s Article 5, under which allies pledge assistance to a member under attack. However, neither framework necessarily requires an automatic deployment of troops, leaving governments some latitude in deciding how to respond.
The partnership brings together three complementary sources of power. Turkey contributes an increasingly sophisticated defence industry, particularly in drones, missiles and electronic warfare. Pakistan provides a large standing army, ballistic-missile capabilities and nuclear deterrence, while Saudi Arabia offers the financial resources needed to fund procurement, investment and joint production.
Turkish Defence Ministry spokesperson Rear Admiral Zeki Aktürk said the agreement aims to strengthen military cooperation and the three countries’ capacity to act jointly during crises. Cooperation is expected to begin with command-post and field exercises before expanding into joint land, naval, air and air-defence drills.
Aktürk said the partners would also prioritise unmanned and autonomous systems, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, logistics, maintenance and defence-industrial cooperation. Their foreign and defence ministers, alongside senior commanders, are expected to oversee political and military coordination.
Ankara had sought membership in the Saudi-Pakistani defence framework before the Mecca agreement. Bloomberg reported in 2025 that Turkey was discussing entry into the bilateral mutual-defence arrangement signed by Riyadh and Islamabad that September.
According to Kayaoglu, Turkey’s interest reflects mounting concern about Israel’s regional posture. Relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv deteriorated sharply after the Gaza war, while Israeli attacks in Syria, including near locations considered for Turkish military deployments, increased the danger of a direct confrontation.
Gökhan Ereli, an assistant professor at Ibn Haldun University, told Al-Monitor that Ankara, Riyadh and Islamabad were all uncomfortable with Israel and the United States shaping a new regional security environment after October 2023. He added that the three also opposed the emergence of Iranian regional hegemony, despite Tehran itself coming under Israeli and American attack.
Turkey and Iran previously supported opposing sides in Syria, while Ankara regards Iranian-backed armed groups in Iraq as obstacles to its influence. Saudi-Iranian competition has been particularly visible in Yemen, and Pakistan has repeatedly accused Iran of allowing separatist militants to operate across their shared border.
The pact nevertheless creates strategic risks. Israel sees Turkey as a competitor, India remains Pakistan’s principal rival, and Greece has unresolved disputes with Ankara in the eastern Mediterranean. Emirati commentator Abdulkhaleq Abdulla also questioned the alliance’s purpose, asking on X which common enemy its members had identified.
More importantly, the agreement does not clarify whether an attack would trigger direct intervention or merely political, logistical or intelligence support. Divergent national interests could therefore test its credibility.
For Turkey, overlapping regional and NATO commitments may also raise concerns among Western allies. Pınar Dost of the Atlantic Council, however, told Al-Monitor that the pact could complement NATO by improving interoperability, maritime security and counterterrorism while protecting energy routes between the Gulf and Europe. In that scenario, she said, Turkey could serve as a bridge between the two structures.