Skip to main content

Nicosia Fears Turkey will Test the GSI Cable off Cyprus



Well-informed sources in the Cypriot capital fear Turkey is preparing to provoke an incident at sea once cable-laying begins on the Cypriot leg of the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI), the Greece–Cyprus–Israel electricity link, according to the Athens daily Estia.

The logic they describe is one of elimination. If Ankara holds back off Kasos, where Greece retreated two years ago, the pressure moves east. The Republic of Cyprus, those sources say, is the weak link: a state Turkey does not recognise, and one that would have to look to Athens for cover.

Ankara's stated position has not moved. No energy project proceeds in the region without its consent. It presses for co-management, demanding notification of any activity in waters it unilaterally designates as its own and claiming "special sovereign rights" — precisely the rights the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea reserves for coastal states beyond their territorial waters.

A Turkish defence ministry document dated 10 August, published by Nordic Monitor, sets that position in a military frame. It describes preparations for crisis, tension and war in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, notes that deepening Greek–Israeli cooperation has changed nothing in Ankara's approach to security on the island, and commits Turkey to defending the interests of the unrecognized "TRNC" under any circumstances.

Turkey has already answered on the ground. On 20 August in Ankara it signed an expanded package with the Turkish Cypriot side covering fibre optics, natural gas and electricity. Ünal Üstel, "prime minister" of the "TRNC", said gas would come from Turkey, the Kyrenia power station would be converted to run on it, and fibre would reach households by 2027 — a programme he framed as shaping the north for thirty to forty years. ENTSO-E has formally refused the Turkish Cypriot interconnection request, recognising only the GSI.

Athens' exposure now runs through Paris. Meridiam holds 66 percent of the project; the French fund also manages infrastructure in Turkey and keeps a regional office in Istanbul. Estia reports circulating claims that Ankara will reach an understanding with Meridiam over Kasos and shift the theatre southeast.

The calendar sharpens all of it. Greece enters a long pre-election season; Turkey may bring its "Blue Homeland" bill to parliament as early as October. Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis has promised frigates and upgraded F-16s if required. Whether Athens would send them for Cyprus is the question Ankara appears willing to ask. 

Photo: Estia

More News

Iran’s Leaderless War Machine: The IRGC’s Autonomous Cells and the Escalation Nobody Controls

In the fog of a war that has already claimed Iran’s supreme leader and its top military brass, a new and perhaps more dangerous threat is emerging from the rubble of Tehran’s shattered command structure: a Revolutionary Guard Corps that, by design, no longer needs orders from above. Sources with direct knowledge of the situation confirm that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continues to prosecute strikes across the region not under the direction of the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, but according to pre-programmed autonomous protocols embedded deep within its decentralized “mosaic defense” architecture. The result is a war machine that has become, in the most literal sense, self-propelling — and increasingly difficult for anyone to stop. A New Supreme Leader With Limited Command Mojtaba Khamenei was formally elected Supreme Leader on 8 March 2026, succeeding his father Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed in the opening wave of the US-Israeli “Operation Epic Fury...

2026 US/Israel–Iran War Risk: Why the Chance of Escalation Is Meaningfully Elevated

As 2025 closes, the US/Israel–Iran confrontation is no longer a low-grade shadow struggle managed mainly through diplomacy and proxy conflicts ; it is an openly articulated deterrence contest in which leaders have publicly tied credibility to “red lines” and rapid retaliation. President Trump has stated that if Iran rebuilds its nuclear capabilities or continues rebuilding missile capacity , the response could be immediate and more severe—language that reduces room for quiet de-escalation once a new incident occurs.  At the same time, Iran has replied with warnings of harsh consequences for any renewed attacks, reinforcing a mutual-threat environment where misperception and political signaling can substitute for verifiable facts.  Against that backdrop, the key analytical point for 2026 is not whether a “full war” is the default outcome; it is that the probability that a limited clash escalates into a broader, sustained conflict is meaningfully elevated because the stabili...

Iran's Headscarf Rules Quietly Loosen — But No Law Has Changed

Bareheaded women appear openly in Tehran cafés and streets, yet activists warn the shift is fragile and the law remains on the books. Images have been circulating on social media of something that would have been almost unimaginable in Iran just a few years ago: women sipping coffee in Tehran cafés, strolling busy city streets, and sitting in restaurants — all without a headscarf. The scenes have ignited global attention and renewed debate over whether the Islamic Republic is quietly retreating from one of its most defining ideological pillars. For decades, wearing the hijab in public has been mandatory for all women in Iran — a rule enshrined in the Islamic Penal Code since 1983 and treated as a cornerstone of the clerical state established after the 1979 revolution. Violations could result in fines, arrest, or worse. Yet in recent weeks and months, enforcement appears to have noticeably slackened, at least in major urban centres. A Visible Shift on the Streets Reporters and residents...