Syria and Russia have entered a more restrained phase of their long relationship after reaching an agreement that reduces Moscow’s military privileges while preserving channels for economic cooperation and political influence.
Writing for Al-Monitor on Aug. 15, Samuel Wendel reported that the agreement reorganizes Russia’s presence at Tartus and Hmeimim, two installations that were central to Moscow’s regional power projection under former President Bashar al-Assad.
The shift became visible on Aug. 11, when Syrian authorities began receiving wheat and cement at a commercial berth previously used by Russian forces. Russian personnel were simultaneously observed moving equipment away from the pier, according to Reuters.
Under the agreement, negotiated over 18 months, Damascus will recover control of civilian facilities at Tartus and Hmeimim. The military sections are expected to become joint training centers within three months. Russia will retain a military presence, although under tighter Syrian oversight and without the extensive privileges it enjoyed during Assad’s rule.
The arrangement has produced conflicting interpretations. Bloomberg reported on Aug. 13, citing an unnamed Russian source, that Moscow views the deal as securing a lasting foothold, including access supporting Russian operations in Africa. Other observers have described it as a major strategic setback.
Nanar Hawach, a senior Syria analyst at the International Crisis Group, told Al-Monitor that the agreement largely formalizes changes already made since Assad’s fall in December 2024. Russia’s position, he said, is now limited to what the new authorities in Damascus are prepared to accommodate.
Tartus has long served as Russia’s principal Mediterranean naval facility, while Hmeimim provided an important base for air operations and logistics. Aron Lund, a senior analyst at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, cautioned that the agreement’s implications would become clearer after the transition period. Continued Russian access would represent a limited success, he told Al-Monitor, because Moscow had risked losing both installations entirely.
Nevertheless, Russia will operate under substantially greater restrictions. Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s transitional government is asserting Syrian sovereignty while developing ties with the United States, Turkey, Gulf countries and other prospective partners.
Relations also remain complicated by Moscow’s decision to shelter Assad. On Aug. 11, a Syrian court sentenced the former president to death in absentia for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during the country’s 14-year conflict.
Despite that dispute, Damascus has practical reasons to avoid a complete break. Russia remains deeply involved in Syrian supply chains, particularly through oil and wheat exports. It also provides expertise and replacement parts for Soviet-era infrastructure and military equipment.
Russia’s energy role expanded after Assad’s removal cut Syria off from Iranian supplies. Reuters reported that Russian oil shipments had increased by 75% this year, reaching approximately 60,000 barrels per day by May. Russian and Syrian businesses have also discussed creating a logistics hub at Tartus to handle grain, fuel and other commodities.
Moscow’s ability to finance Syria’s wider reconstruction is limited, however. Sanctions and the demands of Russia’s own economy leave it unable to match the investment potentially available from Gulf countries, Europe or the United States. Lund and Hawach told Al-Monitor that Russia’s most realistic role would be to keep essential systems operating rather than fund large rebuilding projects.
Damascus is already looking for alternatives. Reuters reported on Aug. 4 that Syrian officials had told Washington they were prepared to reduce Russian oil imports significantly as part of discussions about removing Syria from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism. Syria is also courting American energy companies and attempting to revive domestic production.
The emerging policy is therefore one of controlled dependence. Sharaa’s government appears determined to retain useful Russian support while gradually replacing it wherever other partners become available. For Moscow, the challenge is no longer to preserve Assad-era dominance, but to turn a diminished military and economic position into a sustainable presence.