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Syrian Court Sentences Bashar al-Assad, Brother Maher and Former Regime Figures to Death



A court in Damascus has sentenced Syria’s former president Bashar al-Assad, his brother Maher al-Assad and several senior figures from the ousted government to death, in one of the most significant judicial rulings since the fall of the Assad administration in December 2024.

The verdict was issued on Tuesday, August 11, by a criminal court in Damascus following proceedings centred on killings, torture and abuses committed during the government’s response to the uprising that began in southern Syria in 2011.

According to Syria’s official SANA news agency, the court convicted Bashar al-Assad of crimes against humanity, premeditated murder and other offences, citing his position at the top of the former state hierarchy and his responsibility for directing institutions implicated in serious violations.

SANA reported that the ruling was delivered by a panel headed by Judge Fakhr al-Din al-Aryan, with representatives of Syria’s National Commission for Transitional Justice, international legal and humanitarian organisations and relatives of victims attending the proceedings.

Among those sentenced was Atef Najib, Assad’s cousin and the former head of the Political Security branch in Daraa. Najib was present before the court, unlike most of the other defendants, who were tried in absentia.

Najib has long been associated with the events that helped ignite Syria’s 2011 uprising. The case examined his role in security operations and the treatment of detainees in Daraa during the first weeks of the protests.

Syria TV had reported ahead of Tuesday’s ruling that prosecutors were seeking the death penalty after the Fourth Criminal Court specialising in transitional justice completed its hearings and received the prosecution and defence submissions. According to the broadcaster, prosecutors argued that witness testimony and evidence in the case were sufficient to establish responsibility for the crimes attributed to Najib and the other defendants.

The trial opened on April 26 and was conducted partly in person and partly in absentia. Syria TV reported that the National Commission for Transitional Justice described the proceedings as public and transparent and said the case had reached the point at which all substantive procedural requirements had been completed.

Assad and Senior Military Figures Sentenced in Absentia

In addition to Bashar al-Assad and Najib, SANA named Maher Hafez al-Assad, former defence minister Fahd Jassem al-Freij, Mohammad Ayman Ayoush, Louay Ali al-Ali, Qusay Ibrahim Mahyoub, Wafiq Saleh Nasser and Talal Fares al-Aysami among those sentenced to death. The court found the defendants guilty of offences including intentional and premeditated killing and torture resulting in death.

Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s younger brother, was one of the most powerful military figures under the former government and was closely associated with Syria’s security apparatus.

Turkey’s T24, citing reporting from Anadolu Agency and SANA, said the Damascus court based its conclusions on investigations and witness testimony concerning the defendants’ responsibility for the violence. It reported that Najib was the only defendant among the leading figures in the case who was physically before the court, while Bashar and Maher al-Assad and the other senior officials remained fugitives.

T24 also highlighted the historical context of the proceedings, noting that Bashar al-Assad was removed from power on December 8, 2024, bringing an end to his government after more than two decades in office.

Daraa at the Centre of the Case

The proceedings have particular symbolic importance because they are closely connected to Daraa, where the Syrian uprising began in March 2011.

Judge al-Aryan said investigations and witness statements established that Najib had been involved in the interrogation of detainees after demonstrations erupted in the city and had played a role in security operations against civilians, according to the account carried by T24.

The repression of the initial Daraa protests developed into a nationwide revolt and eventually a devastating armed conflict that transformed Syria and drew in regional and international powers.

Syria TV reported during the final stage of the trial that prosecutors framed the case not only in legal terms but also in relation to the rights of victims and Syrian society to accountability after years of violations. The National Commission for Transitional Justice presented the proceedings as part of the broader post-Assad effort to establish judicial accountability for serious abuses.

SANA likewise quoted the commission’s head, Abdul Basit Abdul Latif, as describing the ruling in the Najib case as an important step toward justice, recognition of victims’ rights and strengthening the rule of law.

Death Sentences Carry Major Symbolic Weight

The judgments represent a dramatic legal condemnation of the former Syrian leadership, although their immediate practical effect is limited for defendants who remain outside the custody of the new authorities.

T24 noted that Syrian law allows capital punishment for the offences of which the defendants were convicted, but added that no death sentence had been carried out in Syria since the beginning of the new political period following the overthrow of the former government in December 2024.

The ruling therefore carries significant political and symbolic weight beyond the question of whether the sentences can ultimately be enforced. It is among the clearest attempts by Syria’s post-Assad judicial institutions to assign individual criminal responsibility to figures at the very top of the former power structure.

For the new authorities, the proceedings also represent an early test of the transitional justice process: whether accountability for the former government’s abuses can be pursued through credible judicial procedures while addressing demands from victims and their families for justice after more than 15 years of conflict.

 


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