This is Tehran’s Reaction to the Mecca Pact: The Aggreement Raises Fears Iran Could Be Sidelined in a New Regional Order
Iranian commentary views the new Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan as evidence that Middle Eastern states are finally embracing a principle Tehran has promoted for decades: regional security should be provided primarily by regional countries. Yet the same initiative could leave Iran outside the emerging architecture and limit its economic, security and diplomatic options.
According to an analysis published by Ham-Mihan Online, citing Iran’s ISNA news agency, the agreement should not be understood merely as a military pact among three countries. Rather, it offers a glimpse of a multilayered regional order in which governments continue cooperating with the United States while building additional security partnerships of their own.
The pact reportedly declares that an armed attack against any one of its three signatories will be regarded as an attack against all of them. It also calls for stronger defence cooperation, joint deterrence, collaboration between defence industries and coordinated action against terrorism, while reaffirming the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
However, the precise military obligations that would follow an attack have not been made public. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has said the agreement does not target any particular country and remains open to other states seeking regional peace and stability.
The Iranian analysis argues that the agreement formalises an already developing network. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have maintained defence ties for decades, while Saudi-Turkish cooperation has expanded into drones, technology transfer, research and joint production. Mecca therefore converts overlapping bilateral relationships into a potentially expandable trilateral framework.
A Response to the Region’s Recent Wars
Ham-Mihan links the agreement directly to the consequences of the recent US-Israeli confrontations with Iran. Those conflicts demonstrated that American bases, traditionally regarded by Gulf states as protective assets, could become liabilities when Washington enters a direct war with Tehran.
Iranian attacks on US facilities and the resulting threats to energy and shipping routes reportedly forced regional governments to reconsider whether reliance on the American security umbrella might draw them into wars they did not choose.
Nevertheless, the commentary does not interpret the pact as an abrupt Gulf break with Washington. Arab militaries remain dependent on Western weapons, intelligence, training, maintenance and command systems. Instead, Saudi Arabia and its partners appear to be diversifying: retaining their US ties while working with Pakistan, using Turkish defence technology, developing relations with China and preserving political channels with Iran.
The pact consequently sends Washington a message that regional governments want greater autonomy in shaping Middle Eastern security. It may also reflect concern about Israel’s expanding military reach, particularly after operations extending beyond the Palestinian territories into Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Iran.
Tehran’s Danger is Exclusion, not Invasion
For Iran, the principal risk is not necessarily the emergence of an explicitly anti-Iranian military alliance. Ham-Mihan notes that regional governments have generally sought to contain hostility with Tehran, even during periods of intense warfare.
The more serious danger is cumulative exclusion. A growing web of defence, intelligence, economic, energy and transport agreements could establish regional rules without Iranian participation. None of these arrangements may individually be directed against Iran, but collectively they could force Tehran to adapt to structures designed by others.
The analysis compares this possibility with the Caspian Sea, where neighbouring states continued advancing their interests through bilateral and multilateral arrangements despite unresolved disagreements with Iran.
Its conclusion is therefore both a warning and recommendation. Iran’s geography, its position on the Strait of Hormuz and its military capabilities make its complete exclusion impossible. But battlefield deterrence alone cannot secure its future position. Tehran must prepare for the post-war period and pursue active diplomacy before an ostensibly inclusive, regionally led security order takes shape without it.