by Dr. Nikolaos Stelgias
TLF Chief Editor, Fellow Research in the Nicosia University
Ten days after Israeli jets struck the Abu al-Duhur airbase in Idlib, the sharpest aftershocks are being felt not in Damascus but in Washington, where the Trump administration remains visibly split over Israel's forward-leaning regional posture.
The fault line runs through Tom Barrack, US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Syria and Iraq. Barrack called the August 18 strike "unnecessary" and said Ankara had not been told about it, meaning Turkey watched aircraft heading north toward its territory and could reasonably have prepared its own military response. He also suggested the operation may have been intended to provoke Ankara and could relate to political calculations ahead of Israel's elections — stressing this was one possible theory, not an intelligence-based conclusion. He then described the Golan as still occupied in breach of UN resolutions, before walking that back as a description of the territory's historical status rather than an endorsement of the UN position.
The backlash was immediate. Defence Minister Israel Katz said Barrack's remarks were "full of inaccuracies" and contradicted President Trump's positions. Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar said on August 22 that Israel would not accept Turkish bases in Syria. In Washington, activist Laura Loomer reported that Barrack was "on thin ice" and had been recalled for consultations — claims not independently confirmed.
Ankara has read all of this closely, and drawn a conclusion. Turkish officials deliberately declined to frame the crisis bilaterally, casting it instead as a dispute between Israel and the US, and between Israel and the regional and international consensus. The strike drew condemnation from the United States, Britain, the United Nations and regional states. In July, Israel was excluded from CENTCOM's Manama security dialogue, which for the first time included Syria and Lebanon.
That is the evidence base for Ankara's working assessment: Israel is isolated, and patience costs Turkey nothing. On August 27 the Turkish defence ministry said Washington had made no formal request regarding the proposed Turkey-Israel-Syria deconfliction mechanism, called on Israel to halt its attacks, and confirmed Turkish forces would continue helping build Syrian army capacity.
The assessment is only half right. Israel's isolation is real at the level of communiqués, not where it counts — Trump's backing, freedom of action over Syria and the arms pipeline remain intact, while Turkey's F-35 and CAATSA files stayed stalled in August against congressional opposition. And Damascus, not Ankara, is negotiating: Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani met Mossad chief Roman Gofman in Jordan on August 23.
For Nicosia, the variable to watch is maritime. Israeli officials expect Ankara to shift pressure to the Eastern Mediterranean, with warships shadowing Israeli vessels or aircraft intruding into IAF operating areas — tactics comparable to longstanding Turkish pressure on Greece in the Aegean.