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Turkish Parliament Passes Landmark Framework Law Linked to Kurdish Conflict



Turkey’s Grand National Assembly has approved a landmark 12-article framework law intended to provide the legal basis for the disarmament and dissolution process involving the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), marking the most significant parliamentary step yet in the government’s “Terror-Free Turkey” initiative.

The bill, formally titled the Law on Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Integration, was adopted after nearly 12 hours of debate. According to the final detailed voting breakdown reported by Turkish sources, it received 467 votes in favour, 87 against and seven abstentions. Thirty-one deputies did not participate.

The governing Justice and Development Party (AK Party) voted unanimously in favour, with 268 votes. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) also supported the legislation with 44 votes. The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) gave 55 votes in favour.

The main opposition Yeni Parti supported the bill with 35 votes but cast 54 votes against it. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) largely backed the legislation, with 29 votes in favour and two against, although 14 deputies did not take part. All 29 İYİ Parti deputies voted against the bill.

The law is conditional. It will only become operational after security institutions determine that the PKK and affiliated structures have ended their activities and surrendered all weapons and ammunition under their control. This assessment must then be confirmed by a decision of the National Security Council and published in the Official Gazette.

The legislation does not provide a general amnesty or a personal amnesty for PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Instead, it envisages the postponement of certain investigations, prosecutions and sentences involving PKK-related offences once the conditions concerning disarmament and dissolution have been fulfilled.

Proceedings involving offences carrying a maximum sentence of 15 years or less may be postponed for five years, while cases involving more serious offences may be postponed for 10 years. Intentional killings and certain life-imprisonment offences are excluded. If no further terrorism-related offence is committed during the relevant period, proceedings may ultimately be dropped; otherwise, the postponement can be revoked.

The debate exposed differing interpretations of the process. CHP representatives said the Kurdish issue was not solely a security or disarmament matter but also involved equal citizenship, democratic representation, the rule of law and political freedoms. DEM Party leaders described the vote as a historic opportunity to move the issue from the sphere of conflict into a legal and political framework.

The government and the MHP presented the bill primarily as a mechanism to end terrorism and consolidate national unity. MHP Deputy Chairman Feti Yıldız rejected claims that the law amounted to an amnesty, saying existing convictions and criminal responsibility would remain intact.

The vote follows the work of the parliamentary National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission, established in 2025 to develop a political and legal framework for ending the conflict and strengthening social cohesion. The bill’s implementation will now depend on the PKK’s verifiable disarmament and the government’s subsequent legal and administrative steps.

 


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