By Dr. Maysaa Al-Masri
The Red Sea no longer appears to be merely a secondary theatre in the Yemen conflict. As Houthi attacks on international shipping continue, the equation is gradually shifting from the ability to disrupt trade routes from a distance towards an attempt to influence the very geography that governs maritime traffic.
This is where Mokha, Bab el-Mandeb, Perim Island and the Hanish archipelago assume particular importance. These geographic chokepoints could alter the rules of engagement if the Houthis succeed in establishing a significant military presence around them.
There is, however, a fundamental difference between threatening an area and controlling it. Missiles and drones give the Houthis the ability to impose costs on maritime traffic, but maintaining control over coastal positions and strategic islands requires an entirely different set of capabilities: air defence, naval power, continuous logistical support, and sufficient political and military backing to prevent those positions from being gradually worn down.
Any potential Houthi expansion towards Yemen’s western coast should therefore be viewed as a test of the group’s ability to move from a war of attrition to a war of territorial control.
The strategic importance of the western coast lies precisely in the fact that it brings the Houthis closer to one of the most sensitive chokepoints in global trade. Bab el-Mandeb is not simply another maritime passage. It is the link between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and therefore between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean.
If the Houthis were able to establish an advanced and integrated coastal fire network around the strait, they could substantially increase the risks facing commercial shipping without formally closing the waterway.
This is perhaps the most important point. In modern maritime geography, a power does not necessarily have to close a passage completely to achieve the effects of a blockade. It may be enough to make transit prohibitively expensive or dangerously unpredictable.
Yet control of islands is not necessarily an unqualified strategic advantage. Islands are exposed and vulnerable positions. Supplying them is more difficult than sustaining forces on the mainland, while troops stationed there can become particularly vulnerable to surveillance and attack if they lack adequate air and naval cover.
Any permanent Houthi deployment on Perim or the Hanish Islands, should such a deployment materialise, could therefore turn from a strategic asset into a vulnerability unless it forms part of a much broader military system.
The most dangerous dimension of the battle for Bab el-Mandeb, however, is not its Yemeni dimension but its potential impact on the global economy.
Any sustained increase in the risks facing maritime traffic will inevitably affect insurance premiums, freight rates, tanker routes and supply chains connecting Asia and Europe. The strait would not necessarily have to be closed for shipping companies to begin recalculating their options. A sufficiently high probability of attack could, by itself, push some vessels towards longer and more expensive routes.
This is where Saudi Arabia’s western coastline and the port of Yanbu become particularly significant. Saudi oil pipelines leading to the Red Sea form part of the Kingdom’s strategy for reducing its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.
But the value of this alternative cannot be measured by the pipeline alone. It also depends on whether oil delivered to the Red Sea can then reach international markets through a secure maritime corridor. If the southern Red Sea becomes increasingly dangerous, the strategic value of this alternative will diminish.
At the same time, discussion of a potential double pincer around Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb should not be exaggerated. Direct Houthi control over Bab el-Mandeb, even if significantly expanded, would not automatically mean that Iran had acquired the ability to single-handedly control global energy flows.
The situation is considerably more complicated. The two straits operate within very different military and geographical environments, while international powers retain substantial capabilities to protect maritime traffic and keep shipping lanes open.
For Egypt, continued instability in the Red Sea represents a direct threat to the interests of the Suez Canal, whose importance depends on the regular flow of trade between Asia and Europe.
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, increasingly regards the Red Sea as a crucial sphere of both economic and national security, rather than simply as another maritime frontier.
For the United States and European and Asian powers, the equation is different again. Freedom of navigation is a strategic principle, and any actor demonstrating a sustained ability to threaten it automatically increases the likelihood that the confrontation will become internationalised.
It is precisely here that the Houthis may encounter a strategic paradox. The greater the pressure they exert on international shipping, the larger the number of regional and international actors likely to conclude that the cost of allowing the group to operate freely in the Red Sea has become greater than the cost of confronting it.
It is difficult to separate Houthi behaviour from the wider regional environment in which Iran remains a major player. Yet reducing every Houthi action to a direct Iranian decision risks producing an overly simplistic reading of the conflict. The Houthis have their own local calculations and interests, despite the depth of their strategic and military relationship with Tehran.
The paradox, however, is that excessive escalation could produce precisely the opposite of the intended result. Rather than strengthening the negotiating position, it could push Iran’s adversaries towards closer coordination and provide them with additional justification for expanding sanctions and maritime deterrence.
This raises a fundamental question: if the Houthis succeed in reaching and occupying a particular strategic position, can they actually hold it under sustained military pressure?
That is the real equation surrounding Bab el-Mandeb.
Geography gives the Houthis an opportunity to exert pressure, but it does not necessarily give them the ability to defend forward positions indefinitely. Conversely, their opponents may be able to exploit their superiority in air power, naval capabilities, reconnaissance and long-range surveillance to weaken any permanent Houthi deployment.
The next phase of the confrontation may therefore resemble a struggle over the cost of control rather than a contest over who can raise a flag on an island.
If the Houthis acquire the ability to disrupt maritime traffic continuously, they will increasingly become an international security problem. But if they are forced to deploy substantial forces to exposed positions, their territorial gains could instead become a military burden.
From a military perspective, the most likely response by the coalition of affected states would involve one of two options: either rapid clearing operations employing overwhelming firepower and ground landings on the islands to strip the Houthis of their gains, or a suffocating naval and air blockade designed to sever supply lines to these forces and compel them either to withdraw or face eventual tactical defeat.
Ultimately, Bab el-Mandeb is not a prize for whoever reaches it first. It is a test of who can impose a sustainable strategic equation around it.
The transition from a missile war to a war over geography may give the Houthis stronger cards in the short term. At the same time, however, it could bring the conflict closer to the point at which the interests of affected regional and international powers converge around the need to change the rules of the game.
And therein lies the central paradox: the closer the Houthis move towards Bab el-Mandeb, the closer they may also come to triggering the formation of a far broader coalition against them.
* This article was first published on 11 September 2026 in Raialyoum and has been translated into English by TLF for its readers. The opinions expressed in this translated or hosted article do not necessarily reflect the views or editorial positions of TLF.