By Ahmet Erdi Öztürk
Recent developments in Paris point to a significant shift in Europe’s perception of security. On Friday, 18 September, Emmanuel Macron brought together political party leaders and figures expected to play prominent roles in the presidential election at the Élysée Palace. But politicians were not the only ones at the table. Senior representatives from domestic and foreign intelligence, military intelligence, the national security establishment and the energy sector also attended.
The Élysée’s justification for the meeting was itself noteworthy. The “rapid deterioration of the international situation” is no longer being considered solely through the prism of the war in Ukraine, but increasingly in conjunction with energy security and France’s domestic resilience.
It would be simplistic to interpret this as “Europe preparing for war”. Yet it is clear that European capitals have begun to view war, energy, critical infrastructure and the American security guarantee within the same strategic framework. Although NATO officials say they see no imminent threat of a direct attack on the alliance, assessments suggesting that Russian-linked hybrid activities are intensifying have become increasingly prominent.
Paris is not the only example. Recent statements by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk provide one of the clearest indications of this shift. Tusk said the autumn and winter months could prove to be among the most critical periods of the war so far, while revealing that Polish intelligence was assessing the possibility of hybrid attacks involving drones and missiles against countries supporting Ukraine.
This is more than rhetoric. During Russia’s large-scale missile and drone attack on Ukraine on 17 September, Poland scrambled fighter jets and temporarily closed several airports. No violation of Polish airspace was detected, but the episode once again demonstrated just how close the war has come to NATO’s borders.
Germany’s decision to increase its military presence in the Baltic region, which has become increasingly evident in recent weeks, should undoubtedly be viewed in the same context. Berlin’s plan to make its brigade in Lithuania fully operational by the end of 2027 is not a temporary measure. It is based on the assumption that relations with Russia have become a long-term security challenge.
One of the most critical elements of this emerging landscape is the role of the United States in Europe. Following his meeting with Polish President Karol Nawrocki, Donald Trump announced that progress had been made towards establishing a permanent US Army base in Poland. No final decision has yet been taken, but the fact that such a possibility has returned to the agenda sends a clear political message regarding NATO’s eastern flank.
At the same time, however, the Trump administration is reassessing the American military presence in Europe and demanding that European allies assume a greater share of responsibility for their own defence. This dual dynamic complicates Europe’s security calculations and suggests that tensions are unlikely to ease any time soon.
Washington may strengthen its presence in frontline countries such as Poland while simultaneously insisting that Europe expand its own military capabilities. Such tensions are likely to result in greater military capacity across the continent.
Moreover, recent developments are not limited to the prospect of direct military confrontation. Economic developments centred on energy are equally critical. This is why the participation of energy officials in the meeting in France is significant. Paris no longer draws a sharp distinction between war and energy security.
The possibility that conflicts in the Middle East could affect energy supplies, prices and inflation has also become part of Europe’s security calculations. Security is no longer measured solely by the number of tanks, missiles and soldiers.
At first glance, this environment creates significant opportunities for Turkey. As a Black Sea country located on NATO’s southeastern flank, capable of communicating directly with Russia while simultaneously developing defence ties with Ukraine, Turkey could see its influence within the alliance increase further.
The role played by the Montreux Convention throughout the war has also demonstrated that Black Sea security cannot be shaped without Ankara. Following the recent NATO Summit in Ankara, the Mecca Defence Partnership launched by Turkey with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is, in one sense, extending NATO’s sphere of influence into the Middle East.
These factors remain relevant. Moreover, Europe’s efforts to expand its defence capacity could open new opportunities for the Turkish defence industry. In areas including drone systems, ammunition, armoured vehicles, electronic warfare and joint-production models, Turkey is no longer merely a NATO member that contributes troops; it is increasingly becoming an actor capable of supplying defence products.
Yet this picture is not solely one of opportunity. If security tensions between Europe and Russia intensify further, the balancing policy Ankara has pursued for years could become increasingly costly.
Turkey is attempting, on the one hand, to fulfil its NATO obligations while, on the other, avoiding a complete rupture with Moscow because of its energy, trade and diplomatic interests. If activities in the grey zone develop into a more explicit NATO-Russia confrontation, maintaining both tracks simultaneously will become increasingly difficult.
A renewed surge in energy prices would also represent a serious economic risk for Turkey. The country is already feeling the effects directly through fluctuations in fuel prices. If tensions in the Middle East lead to a sustained rise in oil and natural gas costs, the consequences for the current-account deficit, inflation and the exchange rate could be felt rapidly. This, in turn, could place considerable pressure on the government in both domestic and foreign policy.
Ultimately, the picture stretching from Paris to Warsaw does not suggest that Europe is about to go to war tomorrow. What matters more is that European states increasingly believe the grey zone between war and peace is expanding and are preparing accordingly.
For Turkey, therefore, the central question is not whether its geopolitical importance is increasing. The real issue is whether that growing importance will expand Ankara’s room for manoeuvre — and how long Turkey can sustain its balancing act between Russia, NATO, Europe and the Middle East in an increasingly hard-edged security environment.
Ahmet Erdi Öztürk
TLF Editor’s Note: This article was originally published in Turkish by Yetkin Report on 19 September 2026 and was translated into English by The Levant Files (TLF). The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Levant Files.