Damascus says it is investigating. The pattern points to deeper problems either way
What happened near Aleppo?
Before dawn on Monday, 21 September, a series of powerful explosions tore through a Syrian army ammunition depot near al-Eis, south of Aleppo, sending projectiles into the surrounding area.
Roads were closed, nearby residents were evacuated, and emergency teams were initially unable to approach the site because secondary explosions continued. At least four people were injured. Syrian authorities have launched an investigation but have not announced a cause.
Is this part of a pattern?
Yes. Reuters describes the al-Eis explosion as the fourth such incident in Syria this month and reports at least 16 explosions at military storage sites since Bashar al-Assad fell in December 2024.
The September sequence is striking.
On 1 September, ammunition being transported in Binnish, Idlib, exploded, killing at least five people. On 9 September, a temporary ammunition depot near Sarmada exploded, with subsequent reports putting the death toll at 14 or higher. On 18 September, another explosion struck an army weapons depot at Ayyash, west of Deir ez-Zor, killing Defence Ministry personnel.
Then came al-Eis on 21 September.
The concentration of incidents has inevitably raised questions over whether Syria is witnessing a series of accidents — or something more deliberate.
What supports the sabotage theory?
The principal argument is the clustering of the explosions, combined with Syria’s highly contested security environment.
Israel has repeatedly targeted Syrian military infrastructure since Assad’s fall, saying its operations are intended in part to prevent weapons from falling into hostile hands. In January 2025, Israeli strikes targeted military facilities around al-Safira, south-east of Aleppo.
Other hostile actors also remain active inside Syria, while remnants of former armed networks and extremist organisations continue to present security challenges.
The timing of some explosions has also attracted attention. The al-Eis depot exploded before dawn, while the Ayyash incident occurred at night.
None of this, however, constitutes evidence that an external actor caused the latest explosions.
What argues against sabotage?
There are substantial reasons for caution.
Damascus has not publicly accused Israel — or any other external actor — of causing the September explosions, and no publicly available evidence has yet demonstrated an air strike or deliberate attack at al-Eis.
Some incidents also have plausible explanations involving the handling and storage of unstable ammunition.
The Binnish explosion occurred while ammunition was reportedly being transferred, while the Sarmada facility was being used to collect and store weapons and remnants of Syria’s long civil war before their transfer elsewhere.
Secondary explosions are also normal when fires reach ammunition depots, meaning the succession of detonations heard at al-Eis is not itself evidence of sabotage.
There is precedent for accidents. In July 2025, several ammunition-depot explosions occurred in Idlib, with Syrian authorities attributing at least some of them to high temperatures or deteriorating war materiel.
Why might Damascus remain cautious even if sabotage is suspected?
Either explanation would create problems for Syria’s new authorities.
If negligence is responsible, the explosions expose serious weaknesses in the new army’s ability to catalogue, transport and safely store the enormous arsenal inherited from more than a decade of war.
If sabotage is involved, publicly identifying the perpetrator would carry political and security consequences — particularly if suspicions focused on Israel at a time when Damascus and Israel have maintained US-mediated security contacts.
Geography also complicates the Israeli hypothesis. Israel’s publicly stated security concerns have concentrated heavily on southern Syria, whereas September’s major explosions have occurred across Idlib, Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo.
That leaves several possibilities open: poor storage, unstable ammunition, human error, sabotage by domestic actors, remnants of the former regime, extremist groups, or external intervention.
For now, the forensic evidence needed to distinguish between those possibilities has not been made public.
Bottom line: Four major incidents in 20 days are enough to justify serious questions, but not enough to establish sabotage. What is already clear is that Syria’s inherited arsenal has itself become a major security threat — to the soldiers handling it and to civilians living around the country’s military storage sites.
Sources: Reuters; Syrian state media/SANA; Syrian Defence Ministry; The National; regional reporting.