Even if Hormuz reopens and U.S.-Iran tensions ease, the Houthis could sustain a second front in the Red Sea, threatening the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, disrupting routes to Saudi oil port Yanbu and increasing pressure on Riyadh
by Zvi Bar'el
Legend has it that an Ethiopian goat herder was the first to notice the strange behavior of his goats after they nibbled on the fruit of coffee trees growing in the Ethiopian highlands. The herder passed the news on to the local religious scholar, who prepared a drink by mixing the ground beans with water – and the rest is history. Almost.
Ethiopia may be credited with the discovery of coffee as a stimulating drink, but it was in Yemen that the precious beans were transformed into an industrial and commercial commodity, eventually becoming one of the Ottoman Empire's signature and most profitable products.
Ships laden with valuable coffee beans departed the port of Mocha (al-Makha), between Hodeidah and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on Yemen's Red Sea coast, sailing north toward the Egyptian border.
From there, the beans traveled overland by camel to the port of Alexandria in Egypt, making their way onward to Europe.
It was probably Dutch merchants from the Dutch East India Company who gave the coffee they imported the name Mocha, after the Yemeni port from which it was shipped. In doing so, they preserved the name of the city of Mocha wherever the dark beverage is served.
The once-glorious and bustling port of Mocha is now an abandoned battlefield, with fierce clashes raging around it between forces of Yemen's internationally recognized government and the Houthis. Dozens of Houthi missiles and drones fired at the port and the surrounding city last month caused tens of millions of dollars in damage, killed at least 20 people and brought the port to a halt.
Yet beyond the direct damage and loss of life, the Houthi military campaign around Mocha is already having serious strategic consequences as it threatens to reignite Yemen's full-scale war, set the Red Sea front ablaze and shift the military confrontation from the Strait of Hormuz to a new battlefield.
The Houthis have already dealt a significant blow to Saudi Arabia's oil exports, imposing a crippling naval blockade on maritime trade in the Red Sea in July. The route was intended to provide an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, using the oil pipeline that links Abqaiq in eastern Saudi Arabia with the port of Yanbu on the country's western coast.
The pipeline, which had been only partially utilized before the war, became the main conduit for Saudi oil exports, carrying roughly 4.5 million barrels a day until recently, compared with less than 1 million before the war. What had appeared to be an effective alternative route, however, has now been turned by the Houthis into a vulnerable corridor, threatening to undermine the very purpose for which it was intended.
In July, when the blockade was announced, Saudi Arabia was still able to export 3.7 million barrels a day. By August, that figure had fallen to 2.25 million barrels a day, with most of the remaining exports traveling north toward the Suez Canal. Shipments to Asia, meanwhile, had been almost completely cut off.
As with the Strait of Hormuz, where Iran does not need to seize territory or physically control the passage to disrupt shipping, the same principle applies in the Red Sea. The Houthis need only a handful of drones or missiles to make insurers unwilling to cover vessels sailing through the waterway – even those with no intention of calling at Saudi ports. But the Houthis' ambitions appear to extend beyond disrupting maritime traffic.
The nature of the fighting they are waging in the government-controlled province of Taiz, together with their recent seizure of several key towns and border crossings, has raised fears that they intend to expand the territory under their control and push farther south into Yemen.
Yemeni analysts believe the attack on Mocha and its surrounding areas may be little more than a diversion, designed to keep the Yemeni army tied down in the area and stretch its forces thin across other provinces that the Houthis are seeking to capture.
Another possibility is that the Houthis fear any agreement or accommodation between the United States and Iran could come at their expense, and are therefore rushing to secure further victories before Tehran pressures them to halt their advance.
This interpretation, however, rests on the assumption that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy acting under Tehran's direction – an assumption whose validity has not been fully borne out over the course of the war.
The Yemeni army has reported that its forces have retaken several positions captured by the Houthis and carried out strikes against their military bases. Yet the fact that the Houthis were able to seize positions in government-controlled areas in the first place highlights the government's limited ability to wage an effective war against them, let alone mount an all-out offensive.
The Yemeni army has undergone some reforms. Commanders have been replaced, military equipment and weapons – particularly drones and other unmanned systems – have arrived from Saudi Arabia, and the senior command appears to have become more effective and cohesive.
Saudi pressure has pushed the United Arab Emirates out of the conflict, including through a military confrontation between Saudi forces and UAE-backed forces. This has helped strengthen the effort to unify the Yemeni side. But the Yemeni army's capabilities and readiness are only one part of a much broader set of regional considerations.
Seven years of war with the Houthis have taught Saudi Arabia a painful lesson. The cease-fire reached in 2022 has also proved fragile. A single incident – the Saudi decision in July to prevent an Iranian passenger plane from landing at Sanaa airport – was enough to reignite the fighting.
Saudi oil and refining facilities are within range of Houthi missiles and drones, as are the kingdom's airports and civilian infrastructure. After the blockade in the Red Sea and the economic damage it has suffered from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the last thing the kingdom needs is a renewed confrontation with the Houthis.
The Red Sea crisis has also exposed the weakness of the military alliances Saudi Arabia has built to protect shipping. The coalition it assembled with great fanfare at the start of the Yemen war in 2015 has largely fallen apart. A new coalition, created specifically to protect shipping in the Red Sea and announced in July with 14 countries joining, has so far existed largely on paper.
The strategic alliance Saudi Arabia forged with Pakistan last September did not prompt Islamabad to send troops or aircraft to the Yemeni theater, while the trilateral alliance signed last month with Turkey and Pakistan remains on the drawing board.
For now, the prospect of persuading the United States to join another war against the Houthis also appears unlikely. President Trump, who signed a cease-fire agreement with the Houthis in May 2025, appears to have little interest in becoming involved in the Red Sea crisis again. And the Strait of Hormuz may soon be of little concern to him as well. On Friday, he declared that "Hormuz is not what it used to be" because "a lot of alternatives" are being made to the strait.
The real danger for Saudi Arabia, the United States, and even Iran is that Yemen may no longer be merely a secondary front in the confrontation over the Strait of Hormuz. Instead, it could become an independent battlefield, regardless of what happens in the Gulf.
Even if the Strait of Hormuz reopens and direct confrontation between the United States and Iran subsides, the Houthis could still hold the Red Sea hostage, threaten the port of Mocha, disrupt the route to Yanbu, and put pressure on Saudi Arabia. They could also force both the kingdom and the Yemeni government to take military and diplomatic steps that do not necessarily serve Iran's broader interests.
In this sense, Yemen could evolve from an Iranian pressure point into a conflict with a logic of its own – one that continues to shape the regional agenda and makes efforts to stabilize the wider region even more difficult.
*This article was originally published in the Haaretz on September 6, 2026. The opinions expressed within do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of The Levant Files