By Ambassador Dr. Abdullah Al-Ashaal
Iranian-Arab relations have passed through several distinct stages.
The First Stage
The first stage dates back to the emergence of Islam, when Persia followed pre-Islamic religions while the Arabs had embraced Islam. Arabs and Persians confronted one another at the decisive Battle of al-Qadisiyyah, which resulted in the defeat of the Persian Empire and contributed to Persia’s subsequent Islamisation.
At the beginning of the Islamic mission, the Prophet Muhammad sent two emissaries to the Persian emperor. Given the emperor’s disdainful view of the Arabs, whom he regarded as servants of the Persians and Romans, the two emissaries were killed. This incident represented a turning point in relations between the two sides.
When the Arabs subsequently abandoned the principles of Islam, they became diminished in the eyes of the wider world, including Persia.
It should be recalled that Iran continued to be known internationally as Persia until 1936. The Gulf, meanwhile, was historically regarded as Persian from the Iranian perspective and Arab from that of the Arab Gulf sheikhdoms, while foreign sources generally referred to it as the Persian Gulf.
The Second Stage: The Rise of Arab Nationalism
The second stage coincided with the rise of Arab nationalism, represented by leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. These leaders embodied what became known as the Arab nationalist tide.
One of the principal objectives of Arab nationalism was to oppose Western or Persian influence in the Arab region.
When the leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolution fled to Iraq in 1964, Abdel Nasser contributed to supporting him in his confrontation with the Shah, who was an ally of Israel and closely aligned with the United States.
At the same time, however, the Arab nationalist movement opposed Iranian influence in the Gulf and promoted the use of the term “Arabian Gulf” in place of “Persian Gulf”.
Iran has historically exercised considerable influence over the Gulf, extending back centuries. It also claimed sovereignty over Bahrain, while another dispute emerged between Iran and the United Arab Emirates following the establishment of the UAE in 1971 over the disputed Gulf islands.
The Arab side maintains that the islands are Arab, whereas Iran insists that they are Iranian. The Arab League rallied Arab states behind the Arab claim to the islands. Consequently, Arab historical accounts generally present the islands as Arab territory, while Iranian accounts regard them as Iranian.
The United Nations became involved in the dispute over Bahrain between Iran and the Arab nationalist camp in 1969, conducting a consultation with Bahrain’s population under UN supervision. Although a large proportion of Bahrain’s population is Shiite, the overwhelming majority favoured independence from Iran, despite Tehran’s influence stemming from geographical proximity and religious ties.
When I was establishing the Bahrain Institute for Political Development in 2006, I was hosted at the home of a Bahraini Shiite leader. I noticed that he had displayed a photograph of Iran’s Supreme Leader rather than one of Bahrain’s King Hamad. I pointed out to him that he was Bahraini and that, regardless of his various connections with Iran, a photograph of King Hamad should occupy that place.
Later, amid the dispute between Bahrain’s Shiite community and the government, a Shiite representative met me in Cairo and asked me to intervene in an effort to reconcile the two sides. By then, however, it was already very late. Hostility between the Shiite opposition and Bahrain’s Sunni-led government was being driven by numerous factors, the most important of which was the political confrontation between Iran and the United States that had developed since the Islamic Revolution.
The Third Stage: The Current Phase
The third stage is the one we are witnessing today. It began with the joint Israeli-American attack on Iran, launched from US bases in the Gulf, particularly Bahrain, where the US Fifth Fleet is headquartered.
Iran responded by attacking US bases in Bahrain, leading to increased tension in Bahraini-Iranian relations.
After all the Gulf states denied that the American attack had been launched from US bases on their territories, the commander of US Central Command subsequently acknowledged in testimony before Congress that the American operation had been conducted from US bases in the Gulf.
For Iran, this was sufficient to reinforce one central demand: the removal of American military bases from the Gulf. This became particularly significant following statements by Donald Trump which, in the author’s interpretation, indicated that the US bases were not there primarily to protect the Gulf states, but rather to protect Israel from Iran and provide a platform for military action against Tehran.
These developments have further complicated Iranian-American relations and contributed to the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. Any disruption preventing Gulf oil exports through the strait would have severe economic and social consequences for the region’s states.
Iran firmly believes that the Gulf states consented to the American attack being launched from their territory. The reality, however, is that agreements governing US bases impose significant conditions on Gulf states. First, the host Gulf state contributes financially to maintaining the base. Second, American bases effectively operate under US jurisdiction, meaning that an attack on them can simultaneously create a crisis for both the United States and the Gulf state concerned.
The United States, the author argues, proved unable to defend these bases against Iranian missiles and instead resorted to widespread destruction inside Iran, with the declared objective, as Trump put it, of setting the country back dramatically.
Yet Iran’s resilience, despite extensive destruction and suffering, may ultimately deepen awareness among the Gulf states of the nature of the American military presence — one that, in the author’s assessment, protects Israel rather than the Gulf itself.
The resulting conclusion is that neither the United States nor Israel can guarantee Gulf security, while the Gulf states themselves lack the capacity to secure the region independently. Arab national security, centred on Egypt, must therefore play a role in protecting the Gulf.
The Gulf states have experimented with various formulas for guaranteeing their security. Ultimately, Iran will not provide security for the Gulf; Arab national security must do so instead.
For that reason, Egypt must be strengthened and helped to overcome its difficulties so that it can once again occupy its central position in the Arab world — a position from which, in the author’s view, Anwar Sadat withdrew Egypt through his rapprochement with Israel and the United States.
Iran, for its part, is fully aware of the depth of the region’s rulers’ relationships with Washington.
Ambassador Dr. Abdullah Al-Ashaal is an Egyptian writer and diplomat.
* This article was first published on 11 September 2026 in Raialyoum and has been translated into English by TLF for its readers. The opinions expressed in this translated or hosted article do not necessarily reflect the views or editorial positions of TLF.