As Turkey navigates a fragile new phase in its approach to the Kurdish issue, the delay in the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) fully laying down its arms is creating mounting political risks for all major actors involved. According to a recent analysis by Alpaslan Özerdem published in
Özerdem argues that peace processes are won or lost in the daily flow of politics, not just at negotiation tables. He points to the historical precedent of the 2009 Habur border crossing, where the return of 34 PKK members was perceived by some segments of society as a victory celebration for the group, severely damaging the government's "democratic opening" at the time. Today, a similar psychological threshold is approaching as the delay in disarmament coincides with increasingly visible, politically charged condolence ceremonies for PKK members.
In August, the Turkish Parliament passed the Law on National Solidarity and Strengthening Social Integration. However, the law's mechanisms require security institutions to officially verify the end of the PKK's armed presence. With this verification pending, the political bills are piling up.
For President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, explaining the rationale behind political and legal overtures while the group remains armed is becoming increasingly difficult. He faces the challenge of maintaining the trust of his security-focused AK Party base, nationalist voters, and families of martyrs. Similarly, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli, who initiated the surprising push for a "Terror-Free Turkey," faces immense risks. If disarmament fails, Bahçeli will struggle to justify this political gamble to his nationalist constituency.
The pro-Kurdish DEM Party is also caught in a precarious balancing act. They must represent the Kurdish electorate's deep desire for peace while convincing the broader Turkish public that armed politics is definitively over. Özerdem notes that the presence of DEM executives at condolence tents adorned with PKK symbols makes this balance incredibly difficult while disarmament remains stalled.
Furthermore, Özerdem highlights a potential rift between the imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan and the group's leadership in the Qandil Mountains. Recent statements from senior PKK figure Cemil Bayık suggest a growing gap between Öcalan's call for disarmament and Qandil's willingness to implement it. If this gap widens, Öcalan's own authority and leadership capital could be fundamentally undermined.
Ultimately, Özerdem warns of a "second Habur risk." If the delay in disarmament, new demands from Qandil, and the public glorification of the armed group continue to converge, the political cost for leaders to support the peace process may soon outweigh the cost of abandoning it. For Turkey, the critical threshold is clear: the PKK must move to verifiable disarmament, the DEM Party must prioritize the social space for peace, and the government must fulfill its democratization commitments.