By Özdil Nami
In Turkish, there is a beautiful expression for efforts that raise hopes but ultimately fail to deliver: “trying to set fire to ashes.” That image came repeatedly to mind as I watched Secretary-General António Guterres's closing press conference. Standing alone behind the microphones, visibly tired and perhaps disappointed, he seemed to carry the weight of yet another diplomatic effort that had failed to generate the momentum many had anticipated.
The visit had been preceded by considerable speculation. Many commentators suggested that the Secretary-General would arrive with a new initiative, present the parties with difficult choices, or inject fresh momentum into the process. Instead, from the moment he landed, he emphasized that progress ultimately depended on the willingness of the two leaders themselves. His message was clear: the United Nations could assist only if the parties were prepared to help themselves. While this was a realistic assessment, it also suggested from the outset that no significant breakthrough should be expected before his departure.
Since the collapse of the Crans-Montana Conference in 2018, I have increasingly come to the conclusion that the principal obstacle to a settlement lies less in the substance of the negotiations than in the design of the negotiating process itself—or, in today's terminology, its methodology.
From the Turkish Cypriot perspective, the experiences of both 2004 and Crans-Montana demonstrated the political risks of making final concessions on Security and Guarantees without confidence that such concessions would lead to a definitive settlement. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine any Turkish side displaying flexibility on this issue unless there is prior agreement that the process will culminate in one of the two outcomes already accepted by the parties as politically meaningful: either a federal settlement or a two-state agreement.
President Tufan Erhürman's four-point proposal reflects this political reality. Whether one agrees with it or not, it deserved more careful consideration by both the United Nations and the Greek Cypriot leadership. Instead, the discussions once again became focused on confidence-building measures and substantive issues before first establishing a negotiating methodology capable of leading to a conclusive outcome. Predictably, the process once again reached an impasse.
The Secretary-General's own press statement reflected this difficulty. He announced that another expanded meeting would require further progress on methodology, confidence-building measures and substance, while taking into account the convergences achieved in previous negotiations.
The challenge is that these three elements do not necessarily stand on equal footing. Without first establishing a mutually acceptable methodology—one that gives both sides confidence that the process can realistically bring the status quo to an end—it is difficult to see how meaningful progress can be achieved on either confidence-building measures or the core substantive issues. Indeed, there does not yet appear to be agreement even on what “methodology” itself means. The Greek Cypriot leader appears to view it primarily as preserving previous convergences, whereas the Turkish Cypriot leader argues that it must also encompass a defined timeframe and prior agreement that the process cannot simply end with a return to the status quo. Until there is at least a common understanding of what methodological discussions should cover, expectations of significant progress may prove difficult to sustain.
Diplomacy is often compared to a dance. Yet every dance requires not only willing partners but also the right rhythm and choreography. Without the right choreography, even the finest dancers can do little more than go through the motions. Sadly, that was the enduring impression left by the Secretary-General's latest visit to Cyprus.
Image: Gemini
*Özdil Nami is a former Turkish Cypriot negotiator and Foreign Minister of the Turkish Cypriot side. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Levant Files.