By the Editorial Team of TLF
Washington’s warning comes at an awkward moment for Baghdad. American troops are preparing to leave, the promised disarmament of powerful militias has slipped well beyond the withdrawal date, and the war with Iran is making it increasingly difficult for Iraq to stay out of the regional confrontation.
Marco Rubio chose a striking word to describe the danger facing Iraq: “Balkanisation.”
But the US Secretary of State’s warning does not necessarily mean Washington expects Iraq to break apart. The more immediate concern is subtler — and, for Baghdad, perhaps more difficult to manage.
Iraq could remain one country on the map while authority over guns, security and foreign policy becomes increasingly fragmented on the ground.
The timing of Rubio’s intervention matters.
The remaining US forces are due to leave Iraq by September 30 under the phased agreement that ends the international coalition’s military mission against ISIL. At almost exactly the same moment, Baghdad was supposed to be making decisive progress towards bringing armed factions under state control.
That second timetable is already slipping.
And the war with Iran has made the gap between the two much more dangerous.
The Americans Are Leaving. The Militias Are Not
The US withdrawal does not amount to America disappearing from Iraq.
Washington can maintain intelligence cooperation, training, diplomatic and economic ties, while retaining considerable military capabilities elsewhere in the region. Iraqi forces, meanwhile, are formally responsible for the country’s security.
Still, removing the remaining American troops changes something important.
For years, their presence has been one part of the uneasy balance between Baghdad, the Kurdistan Region and powerful Iran-aligned factions. It has constrained some calculations, reassured others and provided Washington with leverage inside a political-security system in which formal institutions coexist with armed groups possessing influence of their own.
Associated Press has reported that the withdrawal is under way. But Baghdad’s parallel attempt to deal with the militias is nowhere near completion.
Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s government had hoped to make substantial progress on the weapons question by the end of September. The deadline has now moved to June 30, 2027.
That is not a minor delay. It means the American military presence could end months before Baghdad settles one of the central questions surrounding the withdrawal: who will be allowed to carry weapons, and ultimately who decides when those weapons are used?
Kurdistan 24 has reported on a proposal beginning with a 90-day suspension of militia attacks, followed by a process for handing over weapons. Its chances of succeeding, however, are closely tied to what happens in the US-Iran war.
Reuters has described the disarmament drive as a major test for the Iraqi government. Some factions appear prepared to discuss arrangements with Baghdad. Others are much harder to move.
Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, among the most powerful Iran-aligned groups, have resisted demands to surrender what they regard as “resistance weapons.”
That leaves Baghdad caught between two bad options.
Push too hard, and the government risks a confrontation with organisations that have fighters, weapons, political connections and years of experience operating inside Iraq’s complicated power structure.
Move too slowly, and the militias may enter the post-American era with much of that power intact.
Then Came The Iran War
Without the regional war, Baghdad might have had more time to manage this problem gradually.
It no longer has that luxury.
Al Jazeera reports that Iraqi armed factions have attacked US forces and Gulf states during the conflict. Rubio has also pointed towards Iran-aligned groups operating from Iraq in connection with attacks on regional energy infrastructure.
The Financial Times has reported that a drone strike on Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline has intensified scrutiny of Iraqi militias. Attribution for individual attacks remains sensitive and, where investigations are incomplete, should be treated cautiously.
But the broader problem does not depend on establishing responsibility for every drone launched or every installation struck.
It is about who gets to decide whether Iraqi territory becomes part of the battlefield.
If an armed faction can launch an attack from Iraq without Baghdad ordering it — and the target responds against Iraq — the distinction between the actions of a militia and those of the Iraqi state can become dangerously thin.
Baghdad may want neutrality. An armed group may want confrontation.
A missile or drone does not necessarily respect the difference.
What ‘Balkanisation’ Means Here
That is what gives Rubio’s choice of language its significance.
The immediate danger is not necessarily an Iraq divided into new states. It is an Iraq in which the central government remains sovereign in law while sovereignty becomes negotiable in practice.
A ministry answers to Baghdad. A militia answers to its own leadership. Political parties compete in elections while armed organisations retain independent military structures. Some of those organisations also maintain close relationships with Tehran.
The country remains formally whole, but the authority to make decisions about war and peace is no longer concentrated in one place.
That is a different kind of fragmentation.
And September 30 could expose it.
The departure of US troops will remove one of the outside forces that has helped shape Iraq’s internal balance. It will not automatically create a vacuum, and Iraq today is not the Iraq of the immediate post-2003 period. Its security forces and institutions have developed considerably.
But something will change when the last troops covered by the withdrawal agreement leave.
The militias will know the Americans have gone.
Baghdad will know it must increasingly manage them alone.
And Washington will be watching from outside.
Baghdad’s Uncomfortable Choice
Rubio’s warning therefore serves two purposes.
It expresses a genuine American concern about what Iraq may look like after the withdrawal. But it also places pressure on the Iraqi government to show that the state, rather than autonomous armed factions, ultimately decides when force can be used.
The difficulty is that Washington is asking Baghdad to solve quickly a problem that has accumulated over years.
A rushed disarmament campaign could produce exactly the instability the United States says it wants to avoid. A slow one could allow powerful factions to consolidate themselves during the transition to a post-US military order.
And the Iran war is squeezing the space between those choices.
That is why the approaching American withdrawal matters beyond the number of soldiers actually leaving.
Iraq’s most immediate danger is not a dramatic partition.
It is something quieter: a country that remains united on the map but cannot always control the armed actors operating inside its borders — or prevent their decisions from pulling the entire state into somebody else’s war.
September 30 was supposed to close the chapter of the US-led coalition’s military mission.
Instead, it may open a much harder one.
Once the Americans leave, Baghdad will have fewer excuses for avoiding the question that has shadowed Iraqi politics for years:
Who, ultimately, controls the guns?
Note: This map was created with the assistance of AI for illustrative purposes. It may contain minor geographical or cartographic inaccuracies and should not be interpreted as depicting existing or proposed political borders.
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