After two years of devastating war, Tigray is again caught between armed forces and unfinished politics. Federal troops say they are making gains; Tigrayan forces have also taken ground. Behind the rival claims lies a harder question: can Ethiopia’s leaders settle the disputes the 2022 peace deal left open before another war exacts its price from civilians?
By The Levant Files
Tigray Is More Than a Front Line
Tigray is Ethiopia’s northernmost region, bordering Eritrea and Sudan. It is home to the Tigrayan people, who speak Tigrinya and have a distinct political and cultural history. Tigray is part of Ethiopia, not an independent state.
Yet the name now carries the weight of a national political struggle. At its centre is the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), a political movement that once led Ethiopia’s ruling coalition and remains the most powerful political force in the region. During the 2020–22 war, its fighters and the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) fought federal troops and their allies.
It is tempting to describe the conflict as a separatist rebellion. That label captures one chapter of the TPLF’s history, but it does not explain the current crisis on its own.
The Separatist Question
The TPLF’s founding manifesto in 1976 called for an independent Tigray. In the years that followed, the movement shifted toward self-rule within a federal Ethiopia. It later became the leading force in the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, which governed the country from 1991 until Abiy Ahmed became prime minister in 2018.
That history matters, but it should not be mistaken for proof that the TPLF’s present objective is independence. The central disputes today concern political power, regional autonomy, contested territory and the future of Tigray’s armed forces. Ethiopia’s constitution recognizes a right to self-determination, including secession; that constitutional provision does not make the current war a simple campaign for independence.
A Peace Deal With Unfinished Business
The 2020–22 war began after relations between the TPLF and Abiy’s federal government deteriorated. In November 2020, the TPLF attacked federal military bases in Tigray. Addis Ababa launched a military operation, with Eritrean troops and Amhara forces also fighting against the Tigrayan side.
The war brought mass displacement, destruction and an immense loss of life. Researchers at Ghent University estimated that 385,000 to 600,000 civilians died in Tigray. The true toll remains uncertain: access restrictions and the collapse of local services made a reliable count extraordinarily difficult. The Associated Press has also reported on the scale and uncertainty surrounding casualty estimates.
The African Union-mediated Pretoria Agreement, signed on 2 November 2022, stopped large-scale fighting. It called for disarmament, humanitarian access and the restoration of federal authority. But peace on paper did not resolve the hardest questions on the ground: who controls Western Tigray, when displaced people can return, who governs the region and what becomes of Tigray’s armed forces. Read the agreement text.
Those unresolved issues have been joined by new political grievances. The TPLF rejected the federal government’s extension of Tigray’s interim administration. Its registration was revoked in 2025, preventing it from taking part in the 2026 elections. For many Tigrayans, the dispute is not an abstract argument over party status: it is about whether the region has a meaningful say in decisions made in Addis Ababa.
Who Is Winning on the Ground?
Recent battlefield claims point in different directions. Ethiopia’s military says it has killed TPLF fighters, detained others and seized weapons. Other reports say federal forces and allied fighters retook Alamata, a strategic town near Tigray’s southern border. Tigrayan forces, meanwhile, reportedly took Mekelle’s airport and moved into neighbouring Afar. The Associated Press reported on the takeover of Mekelle’s airport, while a report on Alamata describes the federal-aligned claim to the town.
These reports do not add up to a clear picture of control. They describe a fast-moving conflict in which each side has incentives to present its own advances as decisive. A town changing hands—or a military statement claiming casualties—is not, by itself, evidence that one side is winning the war.
There are several reasons federal forces may have achieved local gains. The Ethiopian National Defence Force can draw on national military resources, logistics and air power, including drones. Tigrayan leaders have accused federal forces of using drones and artillery in the renewed fighting; the claims and their reported effects still need independent verification.
The TPLF also faces internal divisions. Disagreements over the post-war settlement and the region’s leadership have made it harder to present a unified front. Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s many armed conflicts stretch the federal government’s forces across several regions. Opposition groups have announced a coalition against Abiy’s government, but sharing an enemy does not guarantee that separate groups can coordinate operations or sustain a common strategy.
These pressures may help explain why the front lines shift. They do not establish that Addis Ababa has the upper hand overall. Tigrayan forces have made advances too, and the fighting has reached beyond Tigray. Recent AP reporting describes civilian fears as fighting resumed; Al Jazeera has reported on the fighting spreading across northern Ethiopia.
A Wider Regional Risk
Ethiopia has accused Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt of backing armed opponents; those allegations are disputed. Eritrea fought alongside federal forces in the previous war, but relations with Addis Ababa have since soured amid tensions over regional security and Ethiopia’s pursuit of access to the Red Sea.
Each accusation raises the stakes. If outside governments become more deeply involved, a domestic political crisis could turn into a wider regional confrontation. For now, the evidence and claims should be treated carefully; the risk of escalation is real even where specific allegations remain unverified. The Associated Press reported on the Ethiopian army chief’s accusations and the denials they drew.
The Civilians Left Between Them
For people in Tigray, renewed fighting is not a contest of maps and military communiqués. It threatens homes, roads, schools and the fragile return of everyday life. The region is still recovering from a war that uprooted millions and left deep needs for food, medical care and reconstruction.
The conflict is best understood as a struggle over Ethiopia’s federal order and control of the north, with Tigray’s self-rule at its heart. The TPLF’s early separatist history is part of that story, but it cannot explain the present crisis by itself.
The Pretoria Agreement stopped the guns for a time; it did not settle the political and territorial questions beneath the conflict. The test now is whether Ethiopia’s leaders can return to those questions before battlefield momentum, rival alliances and regional suspicion carry the country into another devastating war.
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