An assessment of more than three decades of U.S. military presence in West Asia suggests that it no longer contributes to regional security, stability or peace in the Middle East. Instead, it is likely to fuel greater tensions and further wars.
By Seyed Hossein Mousavi
President of the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies
Perhaps the time has come to bring this presence to an end. On 6 August 2026, Foreign Affairs published an article by Michael Fuchs, a former Biden administration official, arguing that the U.S. presence does not enhance security. It has even turned countries hosting American troops, along with U.S. military bases and vital facilities in the region, into direct targets, with costly consequences.
He writes: “The cost of U.S. intervention since September 11 has been approximately $8 trillion. Over the years, three million Americans have served in the Middle East wars, in which 15,000 U.S. military personnel and contractors have been killed and 1.8 million have suffered various disabilities. The people of the region have also paid a heavy price, with more than 940,000 killed. Millions more have died in various ways as a result of the chaos caused by these interventions, and more than 38 million have been displaced.”
Holding successive U.S. administrations responsible for this situation, Fuchs calls for the complete withdrawal of American forces from the Middle East after the war with Iran ends. He argues that the recent war with Iran demonstrates that the U.S. military presence is not there to protect Washington’s allies in the Persian Gulf. He therefore proposes that regional security arrangements should be led by the countries of the region themselves.
The question raised by Western analysts is how the strategic vacuum left by a U.S. military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf would be filled. This is a relatively difficult question for Washington to answer, as the Gulf is now caught in a war that has undermined previous expectations and left the future uncertain. This turbulent transition has confronted both the United States and every country in the region with a difficult choice: whether to respond to the risks of the current instability in ways that heighten tensions, or to create diplomatic opportunities for greater stability and de-escalation.
In any event, the old order is collapsing, while a new one capable of replacing it remains out of reach. The Middle East is breaking away from an order dominated by the United States for decades. Its unravelling began less than a decade ago, accelerated after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023, and became unmistakable during the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, which exposed the failure of the American order.
Signs of this rupture can now be seen in the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, perhaps marking the beginning of a reduction in America’s military presence across the region. One of its most striking manifestations has been Washington’s failure to respond to Ansar Allah’s attacks on Aramco’s oil facilities and Saudi oil pipelines, which temporarily disrupted a significant share of Saudi Arabia’s oil production.
Saudi Arabia repeatedly sought American assistance, but Trump stood by his agreement with Ansar Allah, declaring: “They don’t attack us, and we don’t attack them.”
Although the aftermath of 7 October brought the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the slaughter in Gaza, the growing strength of Ansar Allah, the changing balance in the Red Sea and the movement’s dominance over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait pointed to a shift in the regional order.
Israel’s offensives against Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and now the West Bank, which have resulted in the occupation of parts of these territories, have deepened the breakdown of the regional order. At the same time, Iran has reshaped the balance of power by controlling the Strait of Hormuz and disrupting the global economy and energy markets. Together, these developments have opened deeper fractures in an already declining order.
The Gulf states, meanwhile, had been taking advantage of the American order to develop emerging technology and artificial intelligence sectors, launch ambitious projects and display their economic and political strength. They intended to turn the Persian Gulf into the centre of gravity for development in the Middle East. Those ambitions have suddenly come crashing down.
The future of American military bases and facilities in the region is particularly uncertain. Some analysts argue that Washington is reassessing the costs and benefits of this military presence, and that a complete military withdrawal from West Asia would be its most rational course.
The countries of the region, especially the Gulf states, now recognise more clearly than ever the need to seek a stable regional security system. The experience of war has shown that the United States and its ally Israel fundamentally lack the motivation or willingness to defend the Gulf states.
Israel wants to keep the United States engaged in Middle Eastern affairs and committed to supporting it, so that it can retain the upper hand in the regional balance of power. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has sought to establish a Mecca Pact as a counterweight to the Abraham Accords. With the help of Türkiye and Pakistan, and without a U.S. presence, it has tried to lay the foundations for a new regional order. Those involved believed that Egypt’s accession would strengthen the pact further. Some of these countries even proposed bringing Iran into the arrangement, seeking, in their words, to transform it from a source of threat into a partner in regional security.
Alongside these countries, Syria and Iraq are working to build the infrastructure needed for energy pipelines and international transit corridors, hoping to become a land link between Asia and Europe.
Two clear conclusions emerge from these efforts to move towards a new, post-American order. First, the capabilities of regional actors have increased considerably. Second, the emerging order will no longer be unipolar.
Western colonial powers also appear to have lost much of their effectiveness as superpowers capable of shaping the order to come. From now on, it will be the region’s middle powers, whether states or resistance movements, that shape the new system. The great powers have lost some of their effectiveness in the face of new military technologies and have been checked by the unexpected capabilities and military innovations of powers such as Iran.
Countries such as Türkiye, with its conventional military strength, and the Israeli regime, with its air power, appear to be seeking greater capacity to exercise influence within a new system. So, too, are Iran, as the principal actor in asymmetric warfare, and its allies. The old order is therefore visibly collapsing. The future will reveal the direction in which the new one takes shape.
First published in Shargh on 2 October 2026.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of The Levant Files.